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ABSTRACT 
The removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003 enabled Iraqi Shi’a groups, once banned from 
political participation, to once again have a voice. Iran, has also taken advantage of the 
post-Saddam political opportunities by attempting to influence religiously similar groups 
within Iraq, namely the Shi’a community. With approximately 60 percent of Iraqi 
population, the Iraqi Shi’a community has enormous voting power during any 
democratically elected process that could sway Iraq into Iranian hands. U.S. officials are 
apprehensive of the relationship between Iran and Iraqi Shi’a militant groups believing it 
could lead Iraq down a path towards a puppet state, subservient to Iranian regional 
ambitions. This thesis explores whether Iran is responsible for influencing every Shi’a 
militant groups within Iraq. Specifically, this thesis addresses the scope of Iranian 
influence within Iraqi Shi’a militant groups operating within Iraq today to determine the 
overall level of influence Iran has in Iraq. 
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I. IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN SHI’A MILITANT GROUPS IN 
IRAQ 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
 Recently, Iran-U.S. relations have been troubled by Iran’s nuclear ambitions, its 
aid to terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and its expanding regional 
sphere of influence. Of all the controversial decisions Iran has made, U.S. policy makers 
consider Iran’s attempt to influence its neighboring states as having the most 
destabilizing effect on security in the Middle East region. These recent developments 
have lead U.S. policy makers to discuss efforts that will effectively undermine Iran’s 
future ambitions in the region, namely Iraq. To understand the threat posed by Iran in the 
Middle East region, U.S. officials must first identify and understand the current level of 
influence Iran has on Iraq. This thesis aims to analyze the scope of Iranian influence 
inside of Iraq by examining four dominant Shi’a militant groups: (1) the Jaysh al-Mahdi 
(JAM) militia; (2) Keta’ib Hezbollah (KH); (3) Asa’ib Al-Haq (AAH); and (4) the 
Promised Day Brigade (PDB). By doing so, this analysis will provide the evidence 
needed to answer the question: What is the level of Iranian support given to the various 
Shi’a militant groups in Iraq?    
B. IMPORTANCE 
 Since the Islamic Republic of Iran’s establishment in 1979, its leaders have based 
important foreign policy decisions on its attempt to further the States’ Islamic agenda. 
This is evident in its support for foreign radical groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, as 
well as other revolutionary groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. 
By supporting such groups, Iran’s intention has been to spread its revolutionary Islamic 
ideology by denouncing any regional government with pro-Western tendencies by 
directly challenging their legitimacy.1 The end of the Iran-Iraq war, however, a war that 
waged on for almost a decade, signaled a shift in Iran’s foreign policy objectives. Today,  
 
                                                 
1 Daniel L. Byman, Shahram Chubin, Jerrold Green and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Iran's Security 
Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Publishing, 2001), xii. 
 2 
Iran is becoming more cautious of using its revolutionary Islamic rhetoric to shape its 
foreign policies. Instead, Iran has adopted a policy of attempting to increase its regional 
influence through any means possible.  
Popular disenchantment grew with the Iranian people as a result of the prolonged 
Iran-Iraq war. The increased fear of instability in Iran forced the revolutionary regime to 
move away from its foreign policy dominated objectives by focusing instead 
domestically on a renewed focus on economic prosperity and unrest along Iran’s 
borders.2 Since that period, Iran has shifted its foreign policy from ideologically 
motivated goals and ambitions towards more realistic and influential ones. “Today, the 
Iranian leadership pursues a more aggressive, recalcitrant, and more anti-American 
foreign policy than at any other time since the early days of the revolution.”3 The 2010 
National Security Strategy outlines the increasing danger of Iran by stating: 
In addition to its illicit nuclear program, [Iran] continues to support 
terrorism, undermine peace between Israelis and Palestinians, and deny its 
people their universal rights. Many years of refusing to engage Iran failed 
to reverse these trends; on the contrary, Iran’s behavior has become more 
threatening.4 
After the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003, Iran was accused of deploying hundreds of 
intelligence and paramilitary personnel into Iraq with multiple, and sometimes conflicting 
goals.5 Iran’s increasingly aggressive posture towards its Iraqi neighbors indicates its 
intentions to influence Iraq through various means in an attempt to fill the political void 
made after the ousting of President Saddam Hussein. One way Iran has attempted expand 
its influence in Iraq is through the sponsorship and support of Shi’a dominated militant 
groups. These groups can then be used to carry out Iran’s orders by appealing to its 
shared Shi’a identity. Iranian support for Shi’a factions and armed militias has since 
become a major threat to the stability of Iraq. At the same time Iranian support for these 
                                                 
2 Byman et al., Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 9. 
3 Kenneth M. Pollack, “Iran's Covert War Against the United States,” Brookings Institute, 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/1011_iran_pollack.aspx (accessed November 14, 2011). 
4  The National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2010), 26. 
5 Daniel L. Byman, The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism. (Washington, D.C.: The 
Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution, May 2008), 11. 
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groups has allowed them a better strategic position in Iraq once all U.S. forces depart.6 
Additionally, these pro-Iranian proxies could be called upon by Iran if the regime 
perceived itself as being threated on a number of its strategic interests in the region, most 
importantly being that of the country’s infant nuclear weapons program. In the event of 
eminent threat, Iran could activate its proxies to destabilize the region and further 
thwarting the effectiveness of an attack. Iran’s threating nature to security and stability in 
the Middle East region has engaged many U.S. officials in the development of a 
successful strategy intent on bringing Iran back into the international community by 
preventing its further isolation. The 2010 National Security Strategy adds that this can 
only be accomplished if Iran’s leaders themselves are prepared to embrace this shift in its 
international outlook. Only Iran has the ability to restore the confidence of the 
international community and fulfill their obligations.7  
 Although it is not clear whether Iran will be able to assert its will over the Middle 
East region, there is little doubt that the outcome depends on how the U.S. responds to 
the Iranian challenge.8 Though the Iranian challenge itself is vitally important, it is also 
important to the long-term success of the newly formed Iraqi government in the post-
Saddam era. Since 2003, Iran has enjoyed, for the most part, uncontrolled regional 
dominance inside Iraq. Many U.S. officials believe that Iran’s ability to influence Iraq is 
through its Shi’a population, by appealing to them through their shared religious 
identities. After the fall of Baghdad in 2003, the Shi’a population of Iraq, which had been 
historically banned from politics, instantly became stakeholders in the future fate of their 
country. At the same time, many Shi’a militant groups surfaced to take advantage of the 
security vacuum linked to the countries political turmoil created by the removal of 
Saddam. These factions, such as the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) led by Muqtada al-Sadr, have 
been responsible for large scale attacks against U.S. and Iraqi security forces. The JAM 
and other Shi’a groups have also engaged in territorial struggles with Sunni extremist 
                                                 
6 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Iran-Iraq Relations, by Kenneth 
Katzman, CRS Report (Washington D.C.: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing 7-
5700/RS22323, 2010), 1. 
7 The National Military Strategy of The United States 2010, 26. 
8 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2007), 270. 
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groups, such as al-Qaeda, for control over key areas inside Iraq. In 2007, al-Sadr’s 
influence began to wane among his followers in the JAM after suffering heavy losses 
against U.S. and coalition forces. Muqtada chose, in the face of defeat, to disband the 
JAM and offer a cease-fire to coalition forces. This decision was not popular among 
some followers who eventually left to create offshoot organizations known by U.S. 
officials as Special Groups (SP). 
The fractured Shi’a militant groups inside Iraq have found a unique opportunity to 
escalate violent activities against coalition forces while receiving funding, training, and 
weapons from Iranian groups such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - Qods 
Force (IRGC-QF).9 Though these offshoots do not share the same aspirations, they all 
consistently target U.S. forces operating in Iraq in hopes of prompting their eventual 
withdrawal. These groups have even attacked Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in order to 
undermine the current Maliki run government. Most of these groups share a strong sense 
of Iraqi nationalism, however, some believe the premature withdrawal of the U.S. and 
coalition forces has the potential of creating yet another power vacuum and inevitable 
civil war.10 If this were to occur in Iraq, it could provide Iran with a unique opportunity 
of using these Shi’a militant groups to exert its influence into the Iraqi government. By 
doing so, Iran will have successfully created an Iranian puppet state, able to carry out its 
own policies. Recently, much of the fate of Iraq has been left in the hands of the 
inexperienced, Shi’a dominated, Iraqi government. The aim of this thesis is to provide 
U.S. policy makers a framework for understanding Iran’s influence in Shi’a militant 
groups in Iraq. This greater understanding of Shi’a militant movements and their 
involvement with Iran will provide U.S. officials’ better insight into the level and scope 
of Iranian influence in Iraq. In turn, this knowledge can help keep Iraq on an independent 
course set by its own people and not that of Iran.  
                                                 
9 Marisa Cochrane, “Iraq Report: Special Groups Regenerate.” The Institute for the Study of War and 
the Weekly Standard, August 2008, 4. 
10 Faleh Jabar, The Shīʻite Movement in Iraq. (London: Saqi Books, 2003), 28. 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
 It is still not clear how Iran will act in the absence of U.S. and coalition troop 
presence in Iraq. Many believe that Iran may see the drawdown as an opportune time to 
influence Iraq’s Shi’a factions. By influencing Shi’a factions in Iraq, Iran potentially 
gains the ability to meddle in Iraqi politics to its own advantage and that of the Iraqi 
Shi’as friendly to Iran, even at the expense of the current Shi’a led government.11 Others 
believe that there is little that can be done to curb the spread of Iranian’s regional sphere 
of influence.12 Although there are many differing opinions on the future of Iranian 
actions, the only consensus seems to be that it is very difficult to determine Iran’s future 
endeavors in the region, most importantly in Iraq.  
By supporting armed groups in Iraq, Iran has allowed itself a broader range of 
options which include: pressuring U.S. and British forces to leave Iraq; to bleed the U.S. 
militarily; and to be positioned to retaliate in Iraq should the U.S. take military action 
against Iran’s nuclear program.13 Iran has also positioned itself to use these proxy groups 
in response to any possible attack on its regional interests. One tool available today that 
could give U.S foreign policy makers an indication of Iran’s influence in Iraq is the level 
of support given to Shi’a factions within Iraq. “If the U.S. has truly begun to assume a 
defensive posture in the Middle East, it will have to guard not only against Iranian missile 
strikes but also against Iran’s sophisticated use of proxy militant groups.”14 Though 
Iran’s support for Shi’a proxies inside Iraq have the potential of becoming very 
dangerous, this thesis will show that not all Shi’a factions within Iraq are equally 
influenced by Iran. By better understanding the nature of Iranian influence in Iraqi Shi’a 
militant groups, U.S. foreign policy makers will become better equipped to successfully 
counter Iranian interests in the Middle East. 
                                                 
11 Robert E. Hunter, Building Security in the Persian Gulf (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Publishing, 
2010), 37. 
12 Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future, 270. 
13 Katzman, Iran-Iraq Relations, 2. 
14 Scott Stewart, “Iranian Proxies: An Intricate and Active Web,” STRATFOR Global Intelligence, 
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100203_iranian_proxies_intricate_and_active_web?ip_auth_redirect=1 
(accessed November 15, 2011). 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003 enabled Iraqi Shi’a groups, once banned 
from political participation, to once again have a voice. Iran has also attempted to take 
advantage of the post-Saddam political opportunities by influencing religiously similar 
groups within Iraq, namely groups the Shi’a religion. With approximately 60 percent of 
Iraqi population, the Iraqi Shi’a community has enormous voting power that could 
change the fate of the country during any democratically elected process. U.S. officials 
have often become worried that if Iran becomes successful in influencing Shi’a political 
groups in Iraq they may see an Iraqi government subservient to Iran. Is Iran responsible 
for influencing every Shi’a faction within Iraq? This literature review identifies and 
discusses the different Shi’a militant groups operating within Iraq and the research that 
has previously been conducted on the subject. The aim of this literature review is to take 
the current research within this field and identify the gap to answer the question: What is 
the scope of Iranian influence within Iraqi Shi’a militant groups operating within Iraq?   
What are the different Shi’a militant groups operating within Iraq? Who are they 
and what are their objectives? Over the recent years, this question has been thoroughly 
research and analyzed. Although there has been much information contributed to the 
topic of Shi’a militant groups within Iraq, there has been little knowledge dedicated to 
their involvement with Iran. There are three major areas of study that have been found in 
the extensive literature on the subject: (1) Historical research on Shi’a movements in 
Iraq; (2) the involvement of Shi’a militant groups inside Iraq; and to a lesser extent (3) 
Iran’s support for these specific Shi’a militant groups. Of the research conducted on the 
level of Iranian support for Shi’a militant groups operating in Iraq, scholars have failed to 
collectively compare the various levels among the many Iraqi Shi’a militant groups. This 
literature review will identify each area of study to compare and discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of each scholars claim.  
1. History of the Shi’a Movement in Iraq 
The literature on Shi’a movements in Iraq is abundant. From the material 
available, there are two main types of explanations that have been formulated with 
 7 
regards to influence from Iran. One group of scholars, working exclusively with Shi’a 
movements within Iraq, believes there is substantial evidence to support a vast difference 
between Iraqi and Iranian Shi’ism. Yitzhak Nakash’s book, The Shi’is of Iraq, explains 
that the Iraqi Shi’a community has distinguished themselves by their Arab tribal 
attributes and moral values rather than the close interaction between the bazaaris and the 
Ulama in Iran.15 These differences highlight the split between Iranian and Iraqi Shi’a 
religious groups. Jerrold Green’s book, Understanding Iran, has similar conclusions in 
that Gulf Shi’as generally regard Iran with spiritual and emotional affinity, rather than as 
a political model for emulation.16 Vali Naser discusses the relationship between Shi’a of 
Iraq to Iran by explaining rather it is the Salafis who equate the similarities between the 
Shi’as of Iraq and Iran to conflate Sunnism with Arabism, posing as defenders of Arab 
identity and nationalism.17 Together, these scholars collectively indicate that Shi’ism 
from Iraq is distinctly different from that of Iran. 
Faleh Jabar’s, The Shi’ite Movement in Iraq, looks at the Iran-Iraq Shi’a 
connection in a different light, by underlining the issue of citizenship rights dating back 
to the Ottoman and Safavid Iran empires. Both empires, the Sunni Ottoman and the Shi’a 
Safavid dynasties, extended protection over their co-religionists as well as their shrine 
cities in the other’s empire.18 Jabar continues by explaining Shi’ism was equated to 
Persianism and reinforced by both governments of Iraq and Iran. One example he uses is 
the Iraqi government’s decision to deport thousands of Shi’as after the Iran-Iraq war, 
which has continued to be a source of grievance among Shi’as at large whose identity as 
Iraqis has been assaulted.19 Jabar suggests that Iran does have some level of influence 
over Shi’a groups in Iraq. Though these scholars contribute to the understanding of 
Shi'ism in its social, cultural, political and economic dimensions, it is also important to 
note that he explains Iraqi Shi'as have never constituted a homogeneous group as political 
                                                 
15 Yitzhak Nakash, The Shiʻis of Iraq (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 7. 
16 Jerrold D. Green, et al., Understanding Iran (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Publishing, 2009). 
17 Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future, 270. 
18 Jabar, The Shīʻite Movement in Iraq, 69. 
19 Jabar, The Shīʻite Movement in Iraq, 69. 
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analysts have too often insist.20 Ali Babakhan’s, The Deportation of Shi’is During the 
Iran-Iraq War, indicates similar conclusions by explaining the mass deportations, brutal 
repression against Shi’a Islamic parties, and execution of their leaders, all resulted in a 
close cooperation of Iraqi exiles within an Iraqi Islamic political structure and became the 
core and future lever of power for Islamic Iran.21 These scholars indicate that Shi’as of 
Iran and Iraq both share common ethnic and historical ties that unite them on some level. 
These groups within the Shi’a identity, however, often differ from one another and may 
be one reason for the political fragmentation seen in Iraqi politics today. 
2. Existing Studies of Shi’a Groups in Iraq 
There has been extensive research done on Shi’a militant groups in Iraq. Authors 
such as Kenneth Katzman, Christopher Blanchard, Marisa Cochrane, and Abdul-Halim 
al-Ruhaimi have all provided a wealth of knowledge on the major Shi’a factions within 
Iraq throughout history and today. Of these factions, the majority have identified groups 
such as the Shi’a Islamist bloc (United Iraqi Alliance), the Islamic Supreme Council of 
Iraq (ISCI), the Da’wa (Islamic Call) party, and even the factions of Muqtada al-Sadr.   
Abdul-Halim al-Ruhaimi provides a unique historical foundation from the period 
of 1940s to the mid-1950s, in which he indicates as the formative phase during which the 
beginnings of the modern Islamic movements in Iraq started to take shape.22 Of this 
period, one of the most influential Shi’a group, the Da’wa party, was established around 
the same time as the 1958 Iraqi revolution. The aim of the Da’wa party, formed by 
Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, was to restore Islam to the life of Muslims, government by the 
tolerant Sharia, and the establishment of the rule of God on Earth as a final goal.23 Al-
Ruhaimi provides an indicator of the level of Iranian influence by suggesting the Da’wa 
party has recently become a purely Iraqi party. Its membership and leading bodies have 
                                                 
20 Jabar, The Shīʻite Movement in Iraq, 70. 
21 Ali Babakhan, “The Deportation of Shi'is During the Iran-Iraq War,” in Ayatollahs, Sufis and 
Ideologies, ed. Faleh Abdul Jabar (London: Saqi Books, 2002), 202. 
22 Abdul-Halim al-Ruhaimi, “The Da'wa Islamic Party: Origins, Actors and Ideology,” in Ayatollahs, 
Sufis and Ideologies, ed. Faleh Abdul Jabar (London: Saqi Books, 2002), 149. 
23 Al Ruhaimi, Adul-Halim, “The Da'wa Islamic Party: Origins, Actors and Ideology,” in Ayatollahs, 
Sufis and Ideologies, 159. 
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striven to demonstrate an “Iraqi national identity” to distinguish the limits of its political 
relationship with Iran.24 Collectively, these scholars suggest early Shi’a political groups 
may have had connections with Iran historically, but is not as prominent today because of 
a rise in Iraqi nationalism. 
Patrick Cockburn illustrates a more recent connection between Shi’a militant 
groups and their connection with Iranian influence in his book, Muqtada, by stating, “the 
Sadrist movement was historically anti-Iranian, but the U.S. accusations of Iranian 
complicity with Muqtada were to a degree of self-fulfilling.”25 He goes on to explain that 
although Muqtada initially tried to oppose any Iranian material support or influence, he 
was eventually unable to oppose it and accepted some measured financial support, 
modern weapons, and communication systems from them.26 Christopher Blanchard’s, 
Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, indicated similar conclusions by stating, 
“The Sadr clan still has ideological ties to Iran by Sadr’s great uncle, Mohammad Baqr 
al-Sadr, who was a political ally of Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.27 These 
scholars reveal a level of measured support by Iran to the various Shi’a militant groups in 
Iraq. Despite these claims, however, there is little evidence supporting an undeniable 
subordinate relationship Shi’a militant groups in Iraq have to Iran. 
After Saddam’s fall, Sadr’s militia, the “Mahdi Army” (Jaysh al-Mahdi, or JAM) 
estimated at 60,000 strong, fought against the perceived U.S. occupation of Iraq. Iran saw 
the militia as a useful tool against the U.S. in the event of a U.S.-Iran confrontation.28 In 
2007, al-Sadr declared a six-month cease-fire during the Shabaniyah festival and 
pilgrimage. During this time, al-Sadr’s loyalty was tested as the JAM splintered into 
different cells, known as “special groups” (SP). These groups today have used this 
                                                 
24 Adul-Halim, “The Da'wa Islamic Party: Origins, Actors and Ideology,” in Ayatollahs, Sufis and 
Ideologies, 160. 
25 Patrick Cockburn, Muqtada: Muqtada Al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle For Iraq, 1st 
Scribner hardcover ed. (New York: Scribner, 2008), 167. 
26 Cockburn, Muqtada: Muqtada Al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle For Iraq, 169. 
27 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. 
Policy, by Christopher Blanchard et al, CRS Report (Washington D.C.: Office of Congressional 
Information and Publishing 7-5700/RS33793, January 12, 2007), 9. 
28 Katzman, Iran-Iraq Relations, 2. 
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window provided by the split from al-Sadr’s factions to escalate their violent activities.29 
No longer under the leadership of al-Sadr, these groups have acted independently to 
increase the level of instability within Iraq. Some of these groups also tend to overlap in 
similar command structures and objectives. 
3. Level of Iranian Support for Iraqi Shi’a Militant Groups (Special 
Groups) 
There have been many articles and books published about on the Shi’a political 
factions inside Iraq, such as the Da’wa and ISCI political parties, and even its militant 
wings such as the Jaysh al-Mahdi, or JAM. These publications, however, lack evidence 
between the relationship of Iran and its support for Shi’a militant groups in Iraq, 
specifically the offshoots of the Jaysh al-Mahdi groups known as Keta’ib Hezbollah, 
Asa’ib Al-Haq, and the Promised Day Brigade. Marisa Cochrane’s article, “Iraq Report: 
Special Groups Regenerate” regards these offshoots as, “Shi’a militia cells that receive 
funding, training, and weapons from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods 
Force (IRGC-QF), the Iranian Special Forces that export the Islamic revolution to other 
countries.”30 This definition suggests that all Shi’a militant groups operating outside the 
control of Muqtada al-Sadr are under some level of influence by Iran. Similar views were 
also echoed in a press conference conducted in July 2007, by U.S. Army Brigadier 
General Kevin J Bergner, the spokesman for Multi-National Forces in Iraq. General 
Bergner commented on the involvement of Shi’a special groups operating inside Iraq 
against coalition forces by stating, “These special groups are militia extremists, funded, 
trained and armed by external sources… specifically by Iranian Revolutionary Guards 
Corps Quds Force operatives.”31 Many scholars and analysts believe that the majority of 
Shi’a militant groups inside Iraq receive some level of influence and support from Iran. 
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4. Conclusion: What we Know and What we Don’t Know 
There is not one single explanation of the level or scope of Iranian influence in 
Shi’a militant groups in Iraq. Arguably, however, the main contribution of knowledge on 
the subject tends to look at the Shi’a population with regards to its ties to Iran, the role of 
Shi’a militant groups in Iran, and in small number of sources, the support given to some 
of these groups by Iran. This basis of knowledge provides little information collectively 
on the level of Iranian influences to Shi’a groups in Iraq or a better understanding of how 
this relationship contributes to the overall strategic ambitions of Iran. 
Scholars and analysis tend to organize all Shi’a militant groups into one category 
as receiving some level of support from Iran. This thesis will fill the knowledge gap by 
analyzing the level of Iranian influence in each Shi’a militant groups in Iraq. By doing so, 
this thesis will determine that not all Iraqi Shi’a Militant groups are supported by Iran. 
Furthermore, of the groups that are supported by Iran, there are varying levels of support 
and objectives. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will use a combination of methods to analyze the question of the Iranian 
level of support given Shi’a militant groups in Iraq. First, through a historical analysis, 
this thesis will identify the founding Shi’a groups in Iraq by focusing on the Da’wa and 
ISCI party formation and its ties with Iran. Next, this thesis will continue a historical 
analysis of identifying activities under the Sunni dominated Ba’ath regime and rule of 
Saddam Hussein to determine what, if any, support they receive from Iran. Additionally, 
this thesis will look at the different Shi’a militant groups after the U.S. invasion to 
understand how it may have changed the dynamics of Iranian influence in Iraq. Finally, 
in the conclusion, this paper will compare the different levels of influence in each Shi’a 
militant group in order to understand the overall scope of Iran’s future power in Iraq. 
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II. THE SHI’A RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN IRAQ: HISTORY 
AND IDENTITY 
Vali Naser writes, “The Middle East will not be defined by its Arab identity or by 
any particular form of national government. Ultimately, the character of the region will 
be decided in the crucible of the Shi’a revival and the Sunni response to it.”32 The most 
important aspect that may determine the outcome of the Shi’a revival is how Iran is able 
to spread its revolutionary ideologies through the region, specifically in Iraq. Do the 
Shi’as of Iraq differ from that of the Shi’as of Iran? Who are the Shi’as of Iraq and how 
did they become dominant political players during the post-Saddam era? This chapter 
will explore the Shi’as of Iraq; who they are, and how they have risen to power within the 
political structure of Iraq. This chapter will also discuss the establishment of various 
violent Shi’a militia groups and how they have split from the more traditional Shi’a 
Islamic organizations.  
A. WHO ARE THE SHI’A OF IRAQ? 
When the modern state of Iraq was formed in 1921, the Shi’a did not constitute a 
close-knit group but were divided into numerous, distinct, self-involved communities.33 
Historically, Iraq has always maintained an important geostrategic position for the Shi’a 
religion as a whole. Some of the major Shi’a shrine cities located in Iraq have been of 
considered a cultural-religious contact zone between the Sunni Ottoman Empire and the 
Shi’a Safavid, and later Qajar Empires of Iran.34 During the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries, the Ottoman and Safavid Empires battled over the area today known as Iraq. 
Though the Ottoman Empire eventually won control over the region of modern Iraq, it 
remained heavily influenced by Iran by its many cultural and linguistic commonalities. 
The two periods of Iranian rule from 1508–1533, and 1622–1638, reinforced the claim  
                                                 
32 Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future, 22. 
33 Jabar, The Shīʻite Movement in Iraq, 63. 
34 Nakash, The Shiʻis of Iraq, 14. 
 14 
that the Safavids, and its successor the Qajars, were to be the sole protectors of Shi’a 
interests in Iraq.35 Despite Iranian influence within Iraq during these periods, a large 
population of Shi’a inside Iraq did not exist.  
It was not until the eighteenth century that Persian Ulama and religious students 
arrived in Iraq in large numbers. This large-scale migration effort was responsible for 
ushering in a new period of Shi’a influence.36 During this period, the Shi’a community 
became a stronger cultural force that was able to take advantage of the instability found 
inside Iraq at the time. In places such as Karbala and Najaf, the Persian religious families 
managed to overshadow the Arab Ulama and succeeded in dominating religious circles.37 
In fact, by the middle of the eighteenth century, the power of the Persian Ulama was so 
significant, that it became a liaison to both the Ottoman and Qajar governments.  
Another source of contention between the Iran and Iraq is the issue of Persian 
citizenry. The Persians that resided in Iraq were allowed to keep their Iranian citizenry 
and were responsible to only the Iranian consular officers who held extra-territorial 
jurisdiction.38 Though this created conflict between the two empires, as allowed Iran to 
continue their influence with the Shi’a of Iraq. “The boundary between Shi’ism and 
Sunnism thus came to coincide with the boundary between empires, with what is today 
southern Iraq extending as a kind of Shi’a salient into Sunnism flank.”39 Although the 
Shi’a population in Iraq during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was significant, 
it was not as pronounced as it became during the nineteenth century. During this period, 
there was a massive conversion of the bulk of Iraq’s nominally Sunni Arab tribes to 
Shi’ism due to the Ottoman policy of tribal settlement. In 1831, the Ottoman resumed 
control over Iraq and encouraged tribesmen to settle down and take up agricultural work 
to boost the Empires tax revenue.40 This transition from tribal to sedentary life in Iraq 
allowed various Shi’a religious leaders better access to greater numbers of people. Cities 
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such as Najaf and Karbala became important centers for conversion to Shi’ism. Migration 
into urban centers enabled religious leaders to influence larger amounts of the population 
making Shi’a conversion more prevalent within Iraq. 
The radical change from tribal to urban living also created an identity crisis 
among many of the newly settled tribesman. The conversion to Shi’ism, for many of 
these people, came as a reaction to coping with the breaking down of their former tribal 
socioeconomic and political organizations.41 These people saw similarities among its 
tribal customs and societal values taught among the Shi’a religion. Despite the 
conversion from Sunnism to Shi’ism among many Iraqi tribesmen, many continued to 
practice traditional tribal customs. This blend of tribal and religious customs created 
many different forms of the Shi’a religion within Iraq and caused fragmenting within the 
religion itself. Iraqi Shi’as have to a great extent been distinguished by their Arab tribal 
attributes and moral values.42 The cultural aspects of tribes and its appearance in Iraqi 
Shi’a groups’ underline just one difference from that found in Iran. Although Sunni 
tribesmen converted to a similar form of Shi’a religion found in Iran, they still 
maintained many of their Arab and tribal values. These values have over time, 
contributed to the many differences between the Shi’a people of Iraq and Iran. 
During the early twentieth century, the Shi’a population in Iraq had become 
increasingly more interested in politics due to the centralization of Shi’a leadership and 
the impact of modernist Islamic thinkers.43 It is important to note that the modernization 
process created among modern the Shi’a of Iraq has been very different than that of Iran. 
Iran established its Shi’a population during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 
which has since become the State’s official religion. In Iraq, however, the modern Shi’a 
population only flourished after the mid-eighteenth century and onwards. Additionally, 
the Shi’a of Iraq have been widely marginalized by their lack of participation in modern 
state politics. Members of the Sunni religion have historically dominated governmental 
positions in modern Iraq until recently.  
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B. THE SHI’A OF IRAQ AND IRAN 
As Ruhollah Khomeini came to power in 1979 after the removal of the Shah, Iran 
moved from its secular trajectory to a Shi’a dominated theocracy. Khomeini thought that 
a similar theocracy, which was successful in Iran, could be instituted in other Shi’a states 
in the region such as Iraq. Although Khomeini tried to fill this role by insisting on the 
establishment of a theocracy in every Islamic state in the region, it never was successfully 
extended beyond Iran’s borders. A number of Shi’a accepted Khomeini as their political 
leader however, chose to look for their religious guidance from other Grand Ayatollahs, 
such as Abu al-Qasem al-Khoi of Najaf, and others.44 The separation between political 
and religious authorities in Iraq is important because, if given the opportunity, Shi’a 
followers will chose to follow Ayatollahs from their home country rather than by an 
outsider of Iran. Many people thought the Islamic revolution of 1979, which occurred in 
Iran would allow Khomeini to become known as the default supreme Ayatollah for all of 
the Shi’a religion. Yet many Iraqi’s of the Shi’a faith chose not to follow him. Of the five 
incomparable Ayatollahs, only Grand Ayatollah al-Khoei was able to gain the most 
reverence among the Shi’a community in Iraq.45 Khoi and Khomeini did not share 
similar religious views as it pertained its involvement in political governance. Khoi 
publicly rejected Khomeini’s theory of velayet-e faqih, or rule of the jurisprudent, 
believing it to be a bogus innovation and urged his followers to ignore Khomeini.46 Since 
Khomeini’s death, the Islamic Republic of Iran has failed to produce another ayatollah as 
important both religiously and politically. The lack of such a powerful Ayatollah within 
the Shi’a faith to forced many leaders to revert back to quietest ayatollahs, such as found 
in the seminaries of Qom and Najaf, who chose not to impede in the government or 
political arena.47  
It is important to understand whom the members of the Shi’a religion in Iraq 
chose to follow as their primary religious mentors. At times, Ayatollahs in the Shi’a faith 
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have been known to wield powerful influence over their followers. In many instances, 
Shi’a scholars historically have been known to exert their influence over their followers 
in a higher capacity than that of the political government. On example throughout Iran’s 
history of the Ayatollah influence over politics is known as the tobacco protest of 1890, 
where a Shi’a led revolt was organized by the Ulama against the tobacco concession 
granted by the Shah to Great Britain. Grand Ayatollah Mirza Hassan Shirazi, believing 
the concession would create severe economic hardships for the people of Iran, issued a 
fatwa for the Shi’a community against the use of tobacco products. The boycott that 
ensued as a result of the fatwa was so powerful that the government ultimately had to 
reverse the policy by denouncing favorable economic support for Great Britain.   
Since the time of the Safavid kings of Iran, the Shi’a faith has been closely 
enmeshed with Iranian identity, as the two have influenced each other.48 “While the 
existence of Persian or Iranian influence at the roots of Shi’ism remains much debated, 
there is no doubt that the development of the faith since the sixteenth century has had a 
large Iranian component to it, and that a far greater proportion of Iranians identify with 
Shi’ism than do Arabs, who have mostly remained Sunni.”49 Since that time however, 
the Shi’a of Iraq have successfully blended their Arab and religious identities to form a 
separate ideology, different from both the Sunni majority in the Arab world, and that of 
the Shi’a dominated Iran. Despite these differences, many Arab regimes have used the 
religious similarities between the Shi’a of Iran and Iraq to their advantage by the 
suggestion of a hidden “Shi’a agenda” cultivated in Iran and spread throughout Iraq. This 
speaks of the Sunni anxiety towards the recent power gains by the Shi’a of Iraq that has 
allowed them to become known as first Arab-world country to adopt a political system 
that gives its Shi’a majority entry into its government.  
C. IRAQI SHI’A SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
Shi’a militant Islam in Iraq can be seen as far back the 1950s, with the formation 
of the Da’wa party. During the 1960–70s, mass Islamic protests and the executions of 
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many Shi’a Islamic leaders by the Ba’athist regime increased the intensity at which these 
Shi’a movements carried out their violent Islamic agendas. During this time, Islamic 
activism revealed the extent to which Shi’a Islamism was in action and capable of 
defying a formidable regime, even long before the rise of Khomeini in Iran.50 Since then, 
the Shi’a Islamic movement has evolved and fractured into many distinctive groups, all 
with different objectives and grievances. Regardless of its leadership, Shi’a Islamism has 
become a major aspect of political and social development inside today’s Iraq.  
It was modernization, which brought people from small villages to larger cities 
that aided in the establishment of a political dimension to the Shi’a faith in the Middle 
East region as a whole. Lebanon during the 1970s brought together fragmented Shi’a 
communities under a political movement known as Harakat al-Mahrumin (Movement of 
the Deprived) led by Imam Musa al-Sadr. Later, that political organization created a 
militia wing known as Amal (Hope). Though Musa al-Sadr was responsible for the 
genesis of Shi’a political organization in Lebanon, the leader was later pushed aside for 
Hezbollah (The Party of God) led by Hassan Nasrallah. Similarly in Iraq during the 
1950s, land reform moved Shi’a peasants from agrarian life and forced them into cities 
such as Baghdad and Basra freeing them from political control.51 Poor conditions found 
among the Shi’a population of Iraq created the need for social services that were 
remedied by Shi’a leaders at the time. Clerical leaders such as the Ayatollah Muhammad 
Sadiq al-Sadr (executed by Saddam Hussein in 1999, and the father of Muqtada al-Sadr), 
Abol-Qasem al-Khoi, and Ali al-Sistani became important leaders in the Shi’a 
community of Iraq because of these reasons.52 These important leaders would later be 
know as founding the Shi’a Islamic Movement witnessed in Iraq. Other Shi’a figures 
later, such as Muqtada al-Sadr, would emulate similar techniques in order to leverage to 
the poorer sections of Shi’a community in Baghdad.  
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D. IRAQI SHI’A NATIONALISM 
The Shi’s of Iraq have a strong foundation for national identification. For the 
Shi’a, secular nationalism was an inclusive identity that was defined above and beyond 
the polemical debates of old and as equals to Sunnis in the eyes of the nation.53 Iraqi 
nationalism, as practiced by the Shi’a community of Iraq, is vastly different to that 
experienced in Iran. Iran historically did not have a similar ideological attachment to 
nationalism because the Shi’a faith always constituted its religious majority. Therefore, 
the Iranian people have never had to fear a government that would express other religious 
views other than their own. Throughout history the Shi’a sense of Iraqi nationalism has 
varied in intensity. In 1920, the Shi’as of Iraq joined Sunni tribes to rise up against their 
British occupiers. The rebellion was quickly put down, and the Shi’a, rather than the 
Sunnis, were punished for their provocation.  
Later, the Sunni compensated for their minority status in Iraq by merging their 
countries identity with that of the larger Sunni Arab world, a world that saw the Shi’as as 
disloyal because of their perceived Iranian influence, which forced many of its leaders to 
flee to Iran.54 Though this was never really the case, Sunni dominated Iraqi regimes 
throughout history have used this same rhetoric to marginalize the Shi’a population 
ensuring they never received entrance into Iraqi politics. The 1920 revolt continues to sit 
heavy on the minds of current Shi’a Ayatollahs of Iraq. Shi’a leader Ayatollah Sistani, 
after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, warned his followers that if they did not act in 
moderation, the U.S. and British would once again lock the Shi’as out of power by rather 
giving it to the Sunnis.55 Moderation was professed by much of the Shi’a religious 
figures in Iraq who chose to work with U.S. forces for inclusion into political 
participation. There were other Shi’a groups however, that did not agree on this mutual  
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relationship based on the historically events between the Shi’a of Iraq and the west. Many 
of these groups choose violence over cooperation with U.S. and coalition forces after 
2003.  
 During the 1960s, when Arab nationalism was at its height, ethnic identity 
became an important measure of political loyalty. If the members of the Shi’a faith were 
considered a threat to Arab nationalism, they would easily be cast as Iranian lackeys and 
enemies to the Arab cause.56 After the Iranian revolution of 1979, however, many Shi’a 
abandoned the notion of secular nationalism to join Islamic Shi’a political movements. 
Riding the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran and its ideological messages, many 
Islamic political organizations were formed. Many of these Shi’a organizations, such as 
the al-Da’wa or Da’wa party (the Islamic Call) of Iraq, received financial and political 
support from Tehran in an effort to push its Shi’a agendas.57 However, the lines of 
Iranian influences in these political movements vary with time and place. 
E. IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
Despite their time spent in Iran, the Shi’a of Iraq did not advocate the idea of self-
rule or an Iran-Iraq merger, but instead stressed their Arab and Shi’a origins together in 
an attempt to accommodate a dual identity within the framework of the Iraqi state.58 
Despite these attempts, the Iran-Iraq war brought fear of this dual identity into the minds 
of the Sunni dominated Iraqi government. As a result, the Iraqi Shi’a community became 
compelled to pledge its alliance to Iraq or that of its similarly religious oriented Iran. 
Ultimately this decision resulted in a negative effect on the Islamic Shi’a groups of Iraq. 
SAIRI, Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which was a popular Shi’a 
political organization founded in Iran, was forced to prioritize its religious identity over 
its national allegiance. This prevented SAIRI from integrating with other religious groups 
in Iraq allowing them to strengthen its Iraqi membership. The Iraq-Iran war also 
strengthened the notion of Iraqi patriotism and was then used to form a strong protective  
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shield around the Ba’athist regime, thereby alienating Islamist groups from mainstream 
popular sentiment.59 The majority of Iraqi Shi’as chose Iraqi nationalism over its 
religious affinities with Iran further separating the two. 
This surge of Iraqi nationalism helped explain how and why Iraq could sustain an 
eight-year war with an army composed of 80 percent of the Shi’a faith, against a Shi’a 
nation led by an Ayatollah of noble descent from the Shi’a Imams.60 This can be seen as 
a primary point of separation for Iran and Iraq. The revolution in Iran was a blend of 
religious identity and nationalism. This attempted movement in Iraq however, did not fall 
on the same lines. After the war ended in 1988, the Iraqi Shi’a Islamic movement entered 
a phase of reconstruction and reorganization which further divided the Shi’a Islamic 
movement from Iran and Iraq.  
F. THE 1991 SHI’A UPRISING IN IRAQ 
Saddam Hussein’s decision to commit forces to the invasion of Kuwait in 
February of 1991 had unforeseeable consequences among the Iraqi Shi’a community. 
Understandably, U.S. and coalition forces were sent to stop the unprovoked invasion of 
Kuwait by resulting in the quick decimation of Iraqi forces. As the Iraqi army was 
perceived as in a moment of weakness, a radio transmission from a CIA-run radio station, 
called the Voice of Free Iraq, broadcast a call for the people to rise up against Saddam 
Hussein and his regime.61 This message indicated that U.S. forces in Kuwait successfully 
weakened Saddam’s forces that created a particularly opportune time for the people of 
Iraq to rise up and overthrow the regime. On 6 March 1991, Richard Dowden of The 
Independent, gave this remarkable account of the situation:  
The revolution, bursting out after years of oppressive Baath rule, appears 
confused and chaotic, united only by the hatred for Saddam Hussein of the 
Shi’a Muslims in southern Iraq. It is the nationalist revolution aimed at 
ridding the country of the Baath regime, according to its leaders, but it 
also has strong overtones of an Iranian-style Islamic fundamentalism. Abu 
Iman, the rebel commander of this town, said the regime would be 
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replaced by a government of the people, which would not model itself on 
western democracy or the Iranian revolution, but follow its own path. It 
would be neither Sunni nor Shia but for all Iraqis.62  
Thousands of protesters, mostly unarmed, took to the streets to occupy 
government buildings and free prisoners. At the height of the uprising, rebel forces 
surprisingly controlled fourteen of the country’s eighteen provinces and were even close 
to capturing the Baathist capital of Baghdad. Saddam’s forces eventually reinstated order 
within Iraq by using an imbalanced level of force against the Shi’a dominated resistance. 
Many rebels and their families were shot in their homes, gunned down by helicopters, or 
executed in groups and buried in mass graves. Although actual death numbers cannot be 
determined, during Saddam’s trial, the court had documentary statements from witnesses, 
showing that at least 100,000, and possibly as many as 180,000 Iraqi Shi’a died as result 
of the 1991 repression.63 Those that were able to escape the brutality of the Baathist 
regime during its repression were forced to flee to neighboring countries such as Iran. 
There is a strong sense among many of the Shi’a involved in the uprising that indicate 
that it was not its own capacity that lead to the failure of the revolt, but rather the U.S.’ 
decision not to pursue Iraqi forces from Kuwait inside the borders of Iraq.  
The uprising was able to gain momentum only after President H.W. Bush’s 
speech urging Iraqi Shi’as to rebel against the government. Later in 2003, U.S. 
ambassador James F. Jeffrey offered the Iraqi Shi’a leadership an apology for the U.S. 
inaction during the 1991 uprising. This perception of betrayal by the U.S. still resonates 
among many of the Shi’a communities inside Iraq today. Even the U.S. invasion of Iraq 
in 2003, which was responsible for toppling Saddam and his regime and allowing Shi’as 
to dominate Iraqi politics, was not enough to undo the consequences of the U.S.’ inaction 
in 1991. This can also be one reason for the consistent and consensual anti-U.S. outlook 
among the various Shi’a militant groups operating in Iraq after 2003. However, what is 
also important to glean from the 1991 Iraqi Shi’a uprising is that it was also an 
ideologically nationalistic movement that did not follow an Islamic path set by Iran in 
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1979. The Shi’a of Iraq in 1991, similarly to the Shi’a militant groups in the wake the 
invasion of 2003, did not desire a movement based on the Iranian sense of Shi’ism, but 
rather their own nationalistic one that could appeal to all those who opposed Saddam 
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III. SHI’A POLITICAL GROUPS OF IRAQ 
A. THE DA’WA PARTY 
During the 1940s and 1950s the younger generation of Iraq Shi’as were becoming 
frustrated from their exclusion into politics. This led many Shi’a to attempt to look for 
other entrances into sociopolitical life by following groups such as the Iraqi Communist 
Party (ICP). The appeal to communism, which was a popular movement during the 
period, was closely related to the failure of Iraqi nationalism. Many Iraqis saw 
communism as an ideological movement capable of acting as a unifying framework for 
the country.64 The revolution that took place in 1958 however, proved to many Shi’a the 
failure of the communist ideology. Much of the Iraqi Shi’a community became 
disillusioned after the political outcome realizing that communism was no longer capable 
of bringing about the political order and change that they expected. As a result, the Shi’a 
of Iraq began to look for other sources for inspiration in their communities that could 
appeal to them collectively. It was Islam that was able to fill the ideological and 
sociopolitical vacuum created by the decline of communism in Iraq.65 The Shi’a religious 
establishment, led by Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, established a Shi’a entity 
capable of confronting the secularist ICP followers known as al-Da’wa.66 The Da’wa 
party still exists today and is one of the oldest known Shi’a Islamist parties in Iraq. By 
joining the Da’wa party, Shi’as demonstrated a clear preference for a leadership in the 
organization composed of Iraqis of Arab origin, namely Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.67 The 
Shi’a of Iraq initially chose the secular path of communism, however, resorted instead to 
their religious affinities they were most comfortable with when it failed.  
 The information provided on the formation of the Da’wa party is not very clear. 
Records kept by the party never reveal the exact date of inception or who were the 
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founding members. Some scholars suggest the party was formed by eight clerics and lay 
figures at the house of the leading Shi’a authority, Sayyid Muhsim al-Kakim, in Najaf, 
Iraq on 12 October 1957.68 The aim of the Da’wa party was to restore Islam to the life of 
Muslims, government by the tolerant Sharia, and establishment of the rule of God on 
Earth as a final goal through four distinct phases.69 This four-stage plan was very similar 
to that of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. The Da’wa party formed its first sources of 
indoctrination from the Egyptian thinkers like Hassan El-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and 
Muhammad al-Ghazali.70 The first phase, known as the transformative phase or al-
marhalla al-taghyiriya, was a period that started in 1957, lasted until 1979, and was 
intended to change society intellectually. This phase was not only to promote religious 
gatherings, but also to pressure the government into granting the Iraqi Shi’a people 
greater freedom and rights.71 Though the Da’wa party attempted to influence aspects of 
the Iraqi government, it believed there was a clear distinction between the government 
and the party leaders’ function as religious authorities. Ethics and morals should begin 
with Islam, but ultimately be subordinate in its relationship to a secular government. 
While mostly staying underground, the Da’wa party built its party’s awareness by 
leading student processions and publishing Islamic newsletters and magazines. 
Furthermore, the party sought to expand its membership by appealing to both educated 
lay people, and eventually the Shi’a working class that had originally been attracted to 
the ICP but no longer saw it as a viable option.72 The coup of July 17, 1968 however, 
changed the environment the Da’wa party operated in. Due to the repressive nature of the 
new regime, the party could no longer actively pursuit its transformation. Much of the 
party’s leadership was arrested or executed during the early 1970s by the Baathist regime 
in power. Da’wa was forced into hiding and was able to remain active but very weak. 
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The political phase, al-marhala al-siyasiya, was aimed at arming itself and 
carrying out military operations against the Iraqi government. After it had built its public 
base and won enough mass strength, its goal was to shift to the political level to wage 
struggle for power.73 The Da’wa party was given additional motivation against the anti-
Islamic Iraqi regime in 1979, by the events unfolding in Iran. Sayyid Muhammad Baqir 
al-Sadr used the momentum created by the Islamic revolution in Iran to expand the 
Da’wa party into different parts of Iraq. By late 1979, the Da’wa party had formed a 
military wing later called Shahid as-Sadr, who carried out assassination attempts on 
Saddam Hussein’s top aid, Tariq Aziz. Sadr’s choice to promote violent confrontation 
with the Baathist regime inevitably sealed his own fate.74 As a result of the resistance, the 
regime made membership of the Da’wa party punishable by death and Sayyid 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and his sister were executed shortly thereafter on April 8, 
1980.  
The government continued to mercilessly punish all associated with Islamic 
parties, forcing the bulk of the party’s members to flee from Iraq to Iran.75 As a result, 
their Iranian hosts heavily influenced many of the leaders of the Da’wa party. The party 
became identified with Iran, which in turn, cost them their popularity among the Iraqi 
Shi’a community. This not only had implications among its supporters, but also within 
the party itself. The controversy among the Da’wa leadership eventually resulted in the 
split of the party into several different Iraqi Shi’a factions. Even though much of the 
Da’wa leadership fled to Iran, there was still a significant support structure within Iraq 
that was able to continue military operations against the Ba’athist regime. This militant 
wing of Da’wa in hiding within Iraq was even responsible for assassination attempts on 
Saddam Hussein himself in 1982 and 1987, as well his son, Uday, in 1996.76 
The most notable faction formed from the Da’wa was known as SAIRI, or the 
Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Formed in November 1982 in 
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Tehran, by Sayyid Baqir al-Hakim, SCIRI became known exclusively as an “Iranian 
Creation.” SAIRI was considered, not only an Iraqi tool in the hands of Iran against the 
Iraqi regime, but also as a way to contain the Da’wa party and its decision-making.77 
SAIRI’s establishment can be seen as an important historical aspect of Iranian influence 
because its military and intelligence wings were both managed by actual Iranians.  
After the Iraq-Iran war ended in August 1988, SCIRI was able to leave Iran to 
rebuild and gain support within Iraq. By moving out of Iran, the party was able to 
disconnect itself from its perceived Iranian influence. By establishing itself in Iran and 
then moving to Iraq, SCIRI was able to widen its support base and experience both sides 
of the Iran-Iraq conflict. Such experiences allowed the party to eventually shape its 
identity by adopting significant political, ideological, and organizational changes 
allowing the party it to better cope with the new realities in Iraq, the region, and across 
the globe.78 Though SCIRI was popular opposition against the Iraqi regime, it was not 
the only Shi’a group to do so. The Da’wa party also engaged in efforts against the Iraqi 
government from inside the country on several different occasions.   
The U.S. invasion of Iraq and the subsequent removal of Saddam Hussein and the 
Ba’athist party presented the Da’wa party with an opportunity to reemerge from its 
underground Islamic activism. Today, this new Da’wa party has portrayed itself as a 
genuinely independent Iraqi nationalist movement, particularly since the death of 
Ayatollah Khomeini removed a competing source of allegiance for many of its party 
members.79 However, the future of Da’wa in the post-Saddam era of Iraqi politics has 
been plagued by competition from other Shi’a Islamic groups such as SCIRI as well as 
the Sadrists movement. After Saddam’s death, the Da’wa party was able to gain the 
strongest support among Iraqis. One prominent Da’wa member today, Nuri al-Maliki, 
serves as the Prime Minister of Iraq.  
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B. SUPREME COUNCIL FOR ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAQ (SCIRI) 
The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), formerly known as the Supreme 
Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), is the Shi’a political group with the 
strongest ties to Iran. Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim first established SCIRI in Tehran in 
1982 with the goal of creating a foundation for all future Islamist activism within Iraq. 
The organization emerged as a result of efforts by the Iranian government to unite the 
fragmented Iraqi Shi’a groups under a wider ideological umbrella that could be used in 
opposition to the Ba’athist regime. During the period of 1980–82, Iran had many 
unsuccessful attempts to unify the different Iraqi groups. In 1979, the first attempt by Iran 
to organize the Iraqi Ulama in the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, presided over by Murtadha 
al-Askari, was shortly thereafter disbanded. It was unsuccessful because its leader, al-
Askari was of Iranian origin and a founding member of the Da’wa party.80 Another 
attempt was made by Iran was the creation of The Revolutionary Army for the liberation 
of Iraq (al-Jaish al-Islami Li Tahrir al-Iraq), though was again unsuccessful because of 
the fractional struggles over the power of the leadership.81 These failures eventually led 
to the creation of the Bureau of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Maktab al-Thawra al-
Islamiya fil Iraq), headed by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim. It is important to highlight the 
difficulties Iran has had historically in uniting the Shi’a groups of Iraq. Though there 
have been many reasons for this, most failures have occurred due Iran’s efforts to unite 
these groups under Iranian leadership. 
The goal of the Bureau of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq was to set up and 
provide administrative and logistic support for Iraqi militants, deportees, and refugees 
residing in Iran.82 The Bureau was modeled after the Iranian conception of mass politics 
though the Iranian clerical officials on many occasions kept reprimanding and reminding 
the Iraqis of the weight they should place in the Iranian Imam. Instead, Iran endorsed the 
SAIRI faction, which Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim was appointed speaker, and Mahmud 
al-Hashimi was appointed president. During the early stages of SAIRI development, the 
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party was considered more of an Iranian-sponsored bureaucratic structure put into effect 
to oversee the administrative unification of the fragmented Iraqi Islamist groups.83 
Additionally, the intention was that the SCIRI leadership could form a transitional 
government if Iran was able to capture areas of southern Iraq, mainly Basra.84 To resist 
Iranian pressures on the group, Sayed Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim adopted the term jihad 
musallah (armed holy struggle) to broaden its support structure among Iraqis. Al-Hakim 
states: 
It is true that we agree with the Islamic Revolution [in Iran], but we differ 
from the Islamic revolution in our methods and organization because the 
circumstances under which the Iraqi people live [are different]. In many 
areas there are many other differences between Iran and Iraq, especially 
the nature of the regime in Iraq, which is more repressive compared to that 
of the Shah.85  
SCIRI leadership, although founded in and heavily influenced by Iran, understood that 
people of Iraq ultimately had different political objectives and attempted to change its 
image. 
The Shi’a factions of Iraq which included the Da’wa party and SCIRI, chose to 
distance themselves from Iran and its influences in hopes of gaining greater popularity 
among its Iraqi brothers. During Saddam’s rule, ISCI fielded an underground militia 
known as the “Badr Brigades” which was recruited, trained, and armed by Iran’s 
Revolutionary Guard Corps. U.S. officials claim that members of SCIRI were closely tied 
to Iranian intelligence and received substantial funding during the periods immediately 
following the U.S. invasion.  
On August 29, 2003, Ayatollah Baqir al-Hakim was killed by a massive car bomb 
with at least 75 others, in his hometown of Najaf, after giving a sermon on the need for 
Iraqi unity at the Imam Ali Shrine.86 After his death, Baqir al-Hakim’s brother, Abdel 
Aziz al-Hakim, assumed leadership roles of SCIRI. Abdel was responsible for distancing 
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himself and SCIRI from its Iranian influence, and on occasion, supported U.S. efforts in 
Iraq. Also, he was responsible for changing the name of the group from SCIRI, to the 
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) in order to distance the group from its Iranian 
ties. In 2008, ISCI and its Badr Brigade collaborated with the Maliki government during 
Operation “Charge of the Knights” against Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army. Since 
that time, ISCI leadership has changed several times leaving the organization 
significantly weakened. Abdel al-Hakim was diagnosed with lung cancer and died in 
August 2009, leaving leadership responsibilities to his son, Ammar al-Hakim who now 
has overall authority of ISCI.87 
C. BADR BRIGADES 
The Badr Brigades were primarily composed of Iraqi deportees and Shi’a 
prisoners of war during the Iran-Iraq War. These forces made up part of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard and were trained, armed, and deployed by Iranian authorities.88 
Although the Badr Brigade was originally intended as an Iraqi organization, it was 
commanded by an Iranian colonel with the aims of destabilizing the Iraqi regime by a 
series of bombings.89 These forces were backed by both Iran and Syria, providing Islamic 
groups operating inside Iraq with logistics and flexible bases for mobilization and 
operation. Although SCIRI had been fully absorbed into the Iranian war effort, it also 
demonstrated the lack of attention given to the political organization inside Iraq.90 The 
Badr Brigade fought under the umbrella of the Iranian Islamic revolution rather than 
attempting to obtain control of the Iraqi government.  
During Saddam’s rule, SCRI fielded the Badr Army during the war to conduct 
attacks from Iran into southern Iraq against Iraqi officials. After Saddam’s removal of  
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power in 2003, the Badr Army burrowed into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Iraqi 
police force. Since 2007, the militia has become integrated into Iraq’s political process 
and security forces.91 
D. MUQTADA AL-SADR 
Different than most religious Shi’a factions of Iraq, Muqtada al-Sadr claimed 
legitimacy by reference to his father, Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr. His father was the 
cousin and student of Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, one of the original founding members of 
the Da’wa party. Muqtada was also connected to Baqir al-Sadr in his marriage to his 
daughter. Muqtada’s father, Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, emerged as a marja’ after the 
death of Abu al-Qasem al-Khu’i at the hands of the Ba’athist regime in 1992. As the 
marja’, Sadiq al-Sadr established himself as a charismatic figure, particularly in his 
attempts of restoring the practice of Friday prayer in Iraqi Shi’a mosques.92 Similar to 
Ayatollah Khomeini and Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, Mohammed Sadiq preached the 
establishment of an Islamic state ruled by the learned jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih). However, 
Sadiq did not see a fully Islamic state possible in realistic terms because of Iraq’s 
multiple ethnic and religious groups. When al-Sadr proclaimed his leadership over the 
Iraqi Shi’a, Iran saw it as counter productive to their ideological revolution and took steps 
to distance themselves from the leader by choosing to close al-Sadr’s offices in Iran and 
expelling his representatives.93 As the Shi’a revival in Iraq increased and became more 
demanding, Saddam’s regime took measures to prevent it. Fearing another Shi’a religious 
uprising similar to 1991, the Ba’athist regime assassinated Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr and 
his two sons in 1999, leaving Muqtada al-Sadr as the only remaining living son of the 
marja’.94  
Violence quickly erupted in the Shi’a community after learning of the 
assassination of Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, later to be known as the al-Sadr intifada. The 
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intifada was played out in a series of violence outbreaks throughout southern Iraq against 
Saddam’s regime with little success. The most serious of attempts came on March 17, 
1999, when a groups of armed men attacked Baathist government buildings. Jassem, one 
of the few Shi’a resistance fighters to survive that attack, stated the uprising was 
coordinated among several different groups to include 168 students from the faculty of 
Engineering in the University of Basra, the Iraqi Hezbollah, and the Badr Corps.95 The 
Iraqi rebels waited for the Iranian run Badr Corps to initiate the attack because of their 
superior manpower, equipment, and experience. However, Badr support never arrived to 
assist in the attack that day. It was realized later that at the last moment Mohammed 
Baqir al-Hakim, the leader of SCIRI who controlled the Badr organization, postponed the 
attack without reason.96 This did not stop the other portions of the rebels from carrying 
out the attack that night with heavy casualties and little success. The Iranians, who had 
operational control over the Badr troops, most likely forbid the crossing from Iran to Iraq 
because they saw the uprising as doomed from the beginning. Furthermore, the failure of 
the attack can be used to show the different ideological rifts between the various Shi’a 
groups and their inability to join together as a united and consolidated effort. These rifts 
became more evident after the U.S. invasion of Iraq when Shi’a leaders gained greater 
political power. After suffering catastrophic deaths at the hands of the Saddam regime, 
the al-Sadr movement had no choice but to remain underground. Only after the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq was the al-Sadr movement revived under the direction and command of 
Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr’s only living son, Muqtada al-Sadr.   
After Saddam Hussein’s death, Muqtada became very critical of the political 
apathy of the marja’iyya during the Ba’athist rule by accusing them of allowing his father 
to be assassinated without interference. Muqtada also attacked Abu al-Qasem al-Khu’i 
and Ali al-Sistani by referring to them as the “silent marja’iyya” for coexisting with the 
Ba’athist regime.97 Muqtada saw Ali al-Sistani, who was an Iranian born cleric that never 
relinquished his Iranian nationality, as an outsider who was illegitimate to exercise any 
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kind of religious or political authority over the Shi’a of Iraq.98 This challenge of Iranian 
heritage allowed Muqtada to gain popularity among the middle to lower class Shi’as of 
Iraq who demanded change, but not one marked with Iranian influence. 
As Muqtada’s movement (Jimmat al-Sadr al-Thani) gained more momentum he 
was able to change the name of Saddam City to Sadr City, brining the deprived 
neighborhood of at least 2 million people, mainly Shi’a, under his power base.99 Another 
measure Muqtada used to increase his dominance was eliminating his opposition. One 
opponent, Abdul Majid al-Khoei, son of the late Grand Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-
Khoei, became a threat after he was brought into Iraq by U.S. forces in an attempt to 
bring southern Shi’a cities under some form of pro-U.S. control.100 Just one day after 
Saddam’s fall on April 9, 2003, al-Khoei was murdered by unknown assailants at the 
Imam Ali Mosque in Najif, Iraq. It was alleged that this was not a random act of violence, 
but rather a systematic murder given approval by no one other than Muqtada al-Sadr 
himself. Though there is has never been any factual evidence of Muqtada’s involvement, 
the al-Khoei’s murder proved to be a sensitive moment in the battle for political and 
religious influence over the Shi’a majority, and was the first indicator of the dangers 
confronting coalition forces in the post-Saddam Iraq.101 The ripple effects caused by the 
murder of al-Khoei also translated to a threat to Ayatollah Said al-Hakim who was 
another opponent of al-Sadr and also, the nephew of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-
Hakim, leader of SCIRI. Inter-Shi’a fighting can also been seen as an effort of the various 
militant groups to consolidate power and prevent opposition from forming. 
E. JAYSH AL-MAHDI (JAM) 
Muqtada often accused his enemies as being puppets of the Iranian government. 
Though he opposed Shi’a groups with strong ties to Iran, he was not absent of his own 
dealings with Iraq’s neighbor. In June of 2003, after his first hajj to Mecca, Muqtada 
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traveled to Iran supposedly to consult with Kahdim al-Ha’eri, the nominal leader of the 
Sadrist movement. It was during this visit between the two that Muqtada and al-Ha’eri 
first developed a proposal for creation of an armed militia, later to be known as Jaysh al-
Mahdi (JAM) army.102 The JAM became prominent in April 2004 when it fought against 
coalition forces in East Baghdad and in Najaf.103 From 2006 to 2007, the JAM was also 
entangled in a fierce territorial struggle with al-Qaeda and its Sunni affiliates over control 
of Baghdad.104 In 2007, Muqtada ordered his militia to stand down against U.S. and 
coalition forces. First, he declared a cease-fire at the beginning of the Baghdad Security 
Plan, Operation Fardh al-Qanoon, in February, and later in August after violence erupted 
in Karbala during the Shabaniyah festival.105 These two cease fire attempts initiated by 
Muqtada immediately lead to a decrease in the level of violence against coalition troops. 
It is also important to note that the Iraqi government enlisted the help of Iranian IRGC-
QF commander, Brigadier General Qasim Suleimani, to mediate peace talks between 
Muqtada and the Iraqi government. In the aftermath of defeat, Muqtada organized a new 
movement called the “Mumahidun,” or “Trail blazers,” which the majority consisted of 
social and cultural work to enhance Shi’a living in Iraq. Additionally Muqtada reinvented 
his Mahdi Army to actively combat coalition, but not Iraqi forces.106 Members of the 
JAM that did not agree with Muqtada’s decision to a cease-fire left the group to create 
other militias. These splinter organizations, known as Special Groups, used this as an 
opportunity to continue violence against coalition forces though under different 
leadership. 
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IV. IRAQI SPECIAL GROUPS   
“Special Groups are Shi’a militia cells that receive funding, training, and weapons 
from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), the Iranian 
Special Forces that export the Islamic Revolution to other countries.”107 The Iranian 
government has used these special groups in the past to carry out attacks against Iran’s 
enemies as well as increase its regional influence among its neighbors. Iran’s ability to 
provide advanced weaponry, financial support, and training ensured that these groups 
could not operate independently or without Iranian backing. This dependency created by 
Iran towards the Shi’a special groups has allowed Iran to influence even day-to-day 
operations in Iraq. Iranian support for Shi’a militant groups in Iraq started to surge in late 
2006 as a result of the Hezbollah-Israeli conflict in Lebanon. Many of the weapons that 
were successful in Lebanon were also found in Iraq. Caches seized by coalition troops 
have included many 107mm artillery rockets munitions that show Iranian Defense 
Industries Organization (IDIO) lot numbers and production dates between 2005 and 
2007.108 After 2007, Shi’a militant attacks against coalition troops began to slow due to 
inter-Shi’a rivalry and were even further damaged after the series of Iraqi Security 
offensives in 2008. 
Though the offensive against special groups in 2008 had tactical success, it also 
had some unintended consequences. Increased pressure by U.S. and coalition forces made 
these Shi’a militant groups more desperate, and therefore more accepting of outside 
assistance by Iran. Shi’a militia groups have often accepted this support conditionally 
allowing Iran greater control over their militia operations. The U.S. State Department 
report on terrorism from April 2009 identifies the threat by these groups and its Iranian 
influence: 
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Despite its pledge to support the stabilization of Iraq, Iranian authorities 
continued to provide lethal support, including weapons, training, funding, 
and guidance, to Iraqi militant groups that targeted Coalition and Iraqi 
forces and killed innocent Iraqi civilians. Iran’s Qods Force continued to 
provide Iraqi militants with Iranian-produced advanced rockets, sniper 
rifles, automatic weapons, and mortars that have killed Iraqi and coalition 
Forces as well as civilians. Tehran was responsible for some of the 
lethality of anti-coalition attacks by providing militants with the capability 
to assemble improvised explosive devices (IEDs) with explosively formed 
projectiles (EFPs) that were specially designed to defeat armored vehicles. 
The Qods Force, in concert with Lebanese Hizballah, provided training 
both inside and outside of Iraqi for Iraqi militants in the construction and 
use of sophisticated IED technology and other advanced weaponry.109  
Though these special groups operated under different leadership, they all had the 
objective of targeting U.S. forces operating inside Iraq. Some of these groups have been 
known also to actively seek to undermine the current Maliki run Iraqi government.110 
Many analysts believe that combined offensive waged by coalition and Iraqi Security 
Forces against these Shi’a special groups forced much of its leadership across the border 
into Iran, which have led to fewer attacks against security forces. Many U.S. officials 
believe these groups currently seeking refuge in Iran will eventually return to Iraq after 
receiving additional training and support and attack coalition forces with better success. 
Their return could once again create instability within Iraq and compromise the newly 
established legitimacy of the Iraqi government. As recently as 2011, there has been an 
increase of attacks against security forces by these special groups. This increase can be 
seen as a renewed effort by the Shi’a militant groups to influence the early withdrawal of 
coalition forces from Iraq permanently. The decision of the U.S. government to remove 
the majority of forces from Iraqi in January 2012 has since decreased the level of violent 
attacks by these special groups suggesting it is primarily motivated by its anti-U.S. 
outlook and not its religiously similar ideologies of Iran. 
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A. KETA’IB HEZBOLLAH (KH) 
Keta’ib Hezbollah, or KH, emerged in 2008 after the splintering from Muqtada’s 
Mahdi Army. The primary objective of the group is to force the withdrawal of the U.S. 
from Iraq through military means as well as the establishment an Iranian style Shi’a 
theocracy.111 Out of the Special Group operating in Iraq, KH receives the most influence 
from Iran and considered to be directly supported by the IRGC-QF.  
The leadership and membership of KH is largely unknown. However, Abu Mahdi 
al-Muhandis is a senior adviser to KH and believed to also advise the IRGC-QF. 
Muhandis is credited with training Shi’a militant groups such as KH and JAM, as well as 
organizing weapon transfers and supply distribution from Iran to Iraq.112 Furthermore, 
Muhandis has been accused of sending KH recruits to Iran to receive special training in 
special areas such as bomb making or marksmanship. Muhandis, an advisor to Qasem 
Soleimani, the commander of IRGC-QF, has also been implicated in his participation of 
the bombing of Western embassies in Kuwait as part of an attempted assassination of the 
Emir of Kuwait in the early 1980s.113 KH is known to use intricate weaponry against U.S 
forces and is similar to that seen by the IRGC-QF and Lebanese Hezbollah. KH’s 
sophistication and advanced methods can be illustrated when in December of 2009, the 
group successfully hacked into a U.S. Predator drone video feed, which was then 
reportedly used by the KH to monitor and evade U.S. military operations.114  
Another weapon commonly found in Iraq among KH militants, the explosively 
formed penetrator (EFP), is considered one of the most deadly weapons used against 
coalition troops and can be linked to similar weaponry used by Hezbollah forces in 
Lebanon. Key metal components found in the EFP require sophisticated machinery that is 
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believed not to exist in Iraq.115 Many analysts believe the materials and technical 
expertise used in EFPs can only be found in one place in the region, Iran. For these 
reasons on June 24, 2009, Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberg designated KH 
as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) for their numerous attacks against Iraqi, U.S., 
and other targets in Iraq since 2009.116 KH has vowed to continue attacks against 
coalition troops in an effort to force them from Iraq. They have also indicated that they 
would widen the scope of their violence to include that of the Iraqi government if there 
headway made on the security agreement to extend the U.S.’ involvement in Iraq. 
B. ASA’IB AL-HAQ (LEAGUE OF THE RIGHTEOUS) 
Asa’ib al-Haq (AAH) began operations as early as July 2006. AAH leadership has 
professed allegiance to Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr.117 Unlike the KH, Asa’ib Haq (AAH) 
has fewer capabilities and less direct relations with the Qods Force and is only funded by 
Qods Force middlemen.118 Yussef Hashim, a prominent member of the Lebanese 
Hezbollah, and Ali Mussa Daqduq, were responsible for the formation of the AAH. 
Beginning in 2006, the Iranian government began to utilize the Lebanese Hezbollah to 
assert their influence in Iraq. Later the Qods force appointed Qais Khazali leader of 
AAH. Khazali was also a former al-Sadr movement supporter who studied under 
Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada’s father. Muqtada, however, expelled Khazali from 
the JAM in 2004 for suspected insubordination during the battle of Najaf against U.S. 
forces. Khazali was responsible for overseeing all Iranian efforts in Iraqi militia groups. 
Qais Khazali, and his brother Laith, and Ali Musa Daqduq, were later captured on 
March 20, 2007 in Southern Iraq, by coalition troops. During their capture, a great deal of 
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intelligence was collected with regards to the level of Iranian influence in Iraqi Shi’a 
militia groups. From the individuals and the documents they carried, coalition forces 
found that, “Both Ali Musa Daqduq and Qayis Khazali stated that senior leadership 
within the Quds force knew of and supported planning for the eventual Karbala attack 
that killed five coalition soldier.”119 AAH later kidnapped a British IT consultant with his 
four British bodyguards at the Ministry of Finance in May 2007. As part of a 
reconciliation deal, Khazali was released in December 2009, only a few days after the IT 
consultant was released. In December 2011, Daqduq became the last remaining prisoner 
in American custody to be turned over to the Iraqi government, which was seen by many 
as a highly controversial decision.120 The Obama administration stated that Maliki’s 
government declined to allow the U.S. to take Daqduq out of Iraq to be tried on charges 
of war crimes. AAH, which emerged from JAM, have also been suspected of receiving 
training from both Lebanese Hezbollah and IRGC forces inside Iran. The Qods Force and 
Hezbollah trained in groups of 20 to 60 so that they can function as a unit when training 
was complete and they returned back to Iraq. After completion of training, these units 
would act independently to fight against coalition forces inside Iraq. AAH, in 2009 
accepted a cease-fire agreement, and have recently entered into negotiations with the 
Iraqi government. In February of 2012, AAH handed over the body of the last remaining 
U.S. soldier missing in Iraq. AAH sources indicated that the group was not behind the 
killing but rather just mediators in the process of returning the remains over to the Iraqi 
government.121 
 C. PROMISED DAY BRIGADE (PDB) 
The Promised Day Brigade (PDB) was one of two groups formed by Muqtada 
after his ceasefire against coalition Forces in 2007. At that time, Muqtada began to 
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remove himself and his followers from violence by instead working to achieve objectives 
through peaceful means. He disbanded the JAM in 2008, and chose to keep only a small 
unit of followers for personal security known as Muqaqumum. The Muqaqumum evolved 
into the PDB, which today receives measured funding and support from Iran. The PDB is 
composed of former members of the JAM. It is also likely that some members are former 
members of AAH wishing to continue fighting after AAH accepted a ceasefire with the 
Iraqi government in the summer of 2009.122 Though AAH, as well as the JAM, accepted 
measured support from Iran, they still operate fairly independently. Muqtada, on many 
occasions, has fallen back on the nationalist nature of the Sadrist movement given the 
anti-Iranian sentiment of the Shi’a population at large.123 Muqtada’s acceptance of 
Iranian support is highly dependent on the Iraqi people’s opinion of the perceived level of 
Iran’s meddling in Iraqi affairs. Iranian support for Muqtada, which at one time was 
substantially high, has fallen and can be contributed to the growing anti-Iranian popular 
opinion among Iraqis. 
Though the PDB was created as a personal security force for Muqtada, it has 
evolved into something much larger. In April of 2009, coalition forces killed one Iranian 
backed terrorist and captured six others during a raid that targeted a financier who 
supported both the Mahdi Army Special Groups and the PDB.124 This raid suggests that 
elements of the special group and the PDB are both working together against coalition 
forces. The rift between the various special groups is not as strong as its resolve to 
remove its perceived U.S. occupation from Iraq. Of the information available on Iraqi 
Shi’a militant groups, there is little said about the level to which the special groups 
interact and work together. Though they may have different motivations among these 
groups, they may be seen as supporting each other under similar circumstances.  
Some instances show other special groups working with the PDB; there are also 
indications of disloyalty within the PDB itself. After Muqtada announced his alliance 
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with Maliki and the creation of the Iraqi National Alliance in 2010, the PDB released a 
statement that they would abandon Muqtada if he insists on joining the Maliki 
government. This suggests that members of the PDB may not necessarily agree with 
Muqtada’s peaceful ascension into Iraqi politics. Muqtada decision to participate in Iraqi 
politics show a growing inclination by him, as well as many of the other Shi’a militant 
leaders, to resolve their disputes through peaceful means.  
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V. IRAN’S SUPPORT FOR SHI’A MILITANT GROUPS IN IRAQ 
A. SCOPE AND GOALS 
Revolutionary Islam and Persian nationalism have become the major factors that 
have shaped Iranian foreign policy today. Since the Republics’ establishment in 1979, its 
leaders have used foreign policy to further the States’ Islamic agenda. This is evident in 
its support for foreign radical Shi’a groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas as well as other 
revolutionary groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Iran has 
pursued its revolutionary Islamic agenda by denouncing any regional government with 
pro-Western tendencies by directly challenging their legitimacy.125  
 Persian Nationalism has played an important role in the Iranian foreign policy 
decision process. Iran has traditionally seen itself as being culturally superior to other 
states in the region. However, Persian nationalism has also become a reaction to the over-
extension of Iran’s commitments with political Islam. Nationalism in Iran has become 
defined as an “Iran first” movement that rejects unlimited and costly commitment in 
areas of marginal or indirect importance.126 However, Iran’s identification with Persian 
nationalism has allowed policy leaders to maintain a path different than other countries in 
the region. Today, the Islamic Republic is perhaps best described as a highly nationalistic 
country, seeing itself as a symbolic beacon for global Islamic enlightenment, but whose 
more immediate goal is to drive for regional dominance.127 Regional dominance has 
highlighted the potential benefits from supporting the various Shi’a militant groups in 
Iraq. Iran also portrays the U.S. as a primary obstacle in their ability to spread its 
ideological and national influence. This chapter will explore the Iranian-U.S. antagonism 
that may play an important element in Iran’s support for Iraqi Shi’a militant groups. Is 
Iran and Iraqi Shi’a groups’ antagonism against the U.S. its unifying element?  
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B. U.S.-IRANIAN ANTAGONISM 
The U.S. antagonism has persisted since the establishment of the Islamic Republic 
and can be seen as early as November 1979, when a group of Iranian students decided to 
organize a sit-in at the U.S. Embassy. The sit-in was a reaction to the recently deposed 
Shah’s medical sanctuary in the U.S. The arrival of the Shah in the U.S. triggered fear 
among many Iranians that the Shah’s illness and a developing conviction that U.S. 
officials were planning another coup such that had taken place in 1953.128 Once U.S. 
Embassy officials realized the magnitude of the event they began to shred sensitive 
documents on Iranian relations. Khomeini’s foreign minister Ibrahim Yazdi approached 
the Ayatollah on the growing situation within the US embassy, believing it was the 
residual effects of the revolution, and should be neutralize immediately. Khomeini’s 
answer, to the surprise of the foreign minister, was rather to do nothing. Khomeini 
approved of the occupation, declaring the embassy to be a “nest of spies.”129  Documents 
that that embassy staff had been unable to shred were recovered by the students and later 
published in a series of articles showing some members of the revolutionary leadership 
had been in contact with the embassy staff. The hostage situation defined Khomeini’s 
revolutionary ideals by highlighting the antagonistic relationship with the U.S. However, 
it also provided a pivotal moment in U.S. self-perception, as it served as a reminder to 
U.S. policy makers decision making towards Iran ever since.130 The U.S. embassy 
hostage situation is just one of many situations that have sabotaged any inclination of a    
positive relationship between the two countries. 
 Another event that has historically shaped U.S-Iranian relations is the U.S.’ 
involvement in the Iran-Iraq war. Saddam Hussein’s rise of power in Iraq in 1979 
brought tensions between the neighboring countries. Saddam saw the Iranian revolution 
as an opportunity of weakness that could be exploited to Iraq’s advantage. Iraq had been 
forced to concede to the Iranian Shah’s demands over the sovereignty of the Shatt al-
Arab waterway that marked the border between the two countries. Saddam perceived it as 
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a unique opportunity to reclaim the waterway and acquire new territorial gains. Using the 
embassy siege as a political scapegoat, Saddam violated the terms of the Algiers Accord 
and launched an invasion into Iran. Few Iranian officials believed that Iraq could 
successfully launch an invasion without international support.131 When Iraq did finally 
attack, Iranian public opinion believed that the invasion was really a front for an 
American attack against Iran.  
Despite the international arms embargo on both sides, Iraq enjoyed a steady 
stream of assistance from both the regional Arab states and the West in an attempt to 
prevent the spread of Iran’s Islamic fundamentalism. The failure of the UN to condemn 
the Iraqi invasion was seen by the Iranians as a breach of international law. Furthermore, 
the West denied knowledge of the use of Iraqi chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers. 
Iraq also extended the war into the Persian Gulf by attacking Iranian tankers in an effort 
to destroy the economic foundation of the country.132 Iran retaliated by attacking 
merchant vessels not only of Iraq decent, but also other gulf state flagged vessels. Under 
these pretexts, Western navies, in particular the U.S. Navy, entered the Persian Gulf to 
protect shipping, but in effect launched a second front against Iran.133 The U.S. direct 
involvement in the Persian Gulf resulted in a further straining of U.S-Iranian relations. 
On May 17, 1987, an Iraqi Mirage fighter jet accidentally fired missiles into the USS 
Stark killing 35 sailors onboard.134 President Regan then responded to the incident by 
placing the blame on the “barbarian Iranians.”135  
With the lack of progress on the Iraqi front, Iran sought to extend reach and 
retaliated by pursuing a deliberate policy of destabilization in those Arab countries who 
had supported Iraq by attacking U.S. interests abroad, much focused on Lebanon. 
Throughout the 1980–90s Hezbollah often employed the ideology of armed jihad within 
Lebanon. This included a variety of techniques including martyrdom operations, guerrilla 
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warfare, hostage taking, and forceful seizure of power all with the aim of ridding 
Lebanon of its foreign presence.136 Hezbollah first used martyrdom operations to destroy 
an Israeli military headquarters in Tyre in the fall of 1982 killing 90 Israeli solders. Other 
operations included the U.S. embassy in Beirut in 1983, killing 80 people, and the 
bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks, which killed 241. In response to these operations, 
much of the public opinion in the Middle East supported Hezbollah’s Martyrdom because 
they perceived the U.S. as aiding Israeli efforts for occupation.137 Hezbollah’s mission 
against West occupation was seen as justified when U.S. and French troops withdrew 
from Lebanon in 1984.  
During the 1980s Hezbollah spread its ideologies through acts of violence. 
Groups linked to Hezbollah kidnapped dozens of westerns and held them hostage for 
long periods of time.138 The most known case of kidnapping was the TWA flight 847 
hijack, which took place in 1985. The kidnapping was masterminded by the infamous 
Imad Mughniyah of Hezbollah’s external security force in response to the Israeli 
imprisonment of 766 Lebanese prisoners who had participated in the resistance. During 
the two-week ordeal many passengers were abused and badly beaten. Most known was 
that of U.S. Navy diver, Robert Dean Stethem, who was tortured, murdered, and thrown 
onto the airport tarmac. Another well-known instance of kidnapping of U.S Marine Lt. 
Colonel William R. Higgins by Hezbollah, who was tortured and murdered while 
conducting a United Nations peacekeeping mission in south Lebanon. 
 The hostage situation in Lebanon led to secret agreements between the Regan 
administration and Tehran mediated by Israel. Iran needed weapons and the U.S. wanted 
the hostage situation to be resolved in Lebanon. However, Iran leaked the deal to the 
media that humiliated the U.S. in what became known as the “Contra Affair.” The 
resulting embarrassment marked the last time the U.S. made serious approaches towards 
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the Islamic Republic.139 After the incident, the U.S. abandoned covert assistance to Iraq 
by providing real time satellite images of Iranian troop movement and supplying combat 
doctors to the front line. The U.S. also altered its rules of engagement in Persian Gulf 
operations by actively seeking out Iranian warships. One result of the U.S.’ provocative 
policies against Iran was the USS Vincennes’ accidental shooting down of an Iranian 
airbus en route from Shiraz to the Emirates killing nearly 300 innocent people. Unlike the 
USS Stark event, the U.S. did not make a specific apology to the Iranian government but 
instead criticized them on their decision to allow civilian flights into a war zone.140 Other 
events, such as the U.S. decision to destroy Iranian oil fields, and the Iranian mining of 
the Straits of Hormuz that resulted in damage to the USS Samuel B. Robert, also continue 
to strain relations between the U.S. and Iran.  
 Today, the relationship between Tehran and Washington is still very volatile. The 
1979 U.S. embassy hostage situation still weighs heavily on the minds of both countries. 
The U.S. believes that the takeover was a breach of international law while Iran feels that 
it was necessary to avoid a U.S. sponsored coup to bring back the Shah. Furthermore, 
many Iranians believe Washington authorized Saddam Hussein’s invasion into Iran in 
1980 as retribution for the overthrow of the Shah.141 The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 
2001 and Iraq in 2003 also increased Iranian fear over U.S. regional domination. Iran’s 
inclusion into the “axis of evil” has indicated hostile U.S. intentions and led many to 
believe it was a precursor to the invasion of Iran in an attempt to dismantle the Islamic 
Republic.142 The Iran leadership attribute the U.S. enmity towards Iran in three factors: 
first, the Islamic character of Iran’s system; second, Iran’s insistence on independence (as 
opposed to the Shah’s pro-Western stance); and third, they energy resources in the 
region, which the U.S. seeks to control.143 All of these contentions, no matter the 
validity, have prevented positive U.S. and Iranian relations.   
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C. IRAN’S INFLUENCE IN THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT 
The U.S. occupation of Iraq and subsequent removal of Saddam Hussein left a 
power vacuum for Iran to fill. Iran has attempted to assert its regional influence through a 
number of political, economic, religious, and military opportunities in Iraq. “Iran has 
played a critical role in backing given candidates and parties, as well as brokering post-
election political agreements to form the majority government in every one of Iraq’s 
elections since 2003.”144 One way that Iran has attempted to increase its influence is by 
supporting various Shi’a political parties in the newly formed government. By doing so in 
an effort to gain influence in Iraq, Iran has instead effectively undermined Shi’a unity 
within Iraq. Understanding its folly, Iran has since attempted to unite the various Shi’a 
political groups in Iraq by playing a vital role in the establishment of the United Iraqi 
Alliance (UIA), which included the majority of the Iraqi Shi’a political factions time, 
namely ISCI and Da’wa. The UIA was an effort among various groups and influences to 
join together to take advantage of the political vacuum created during the post-Saddam 
era. 
On 30 June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) transitioned political 
control to the newly formed Iraqi interim government. The president was Ghazi Yawer, a 
Sunni businessman who had strong ties with Washington. A prominent Shi’a Muslim, 
Iyad Allawi, leader of the Iraqi National Accord and former Baathist party member was 
elected as prime minister. Another Shi’a, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, spokesman for the Da’wa 
party was appointed as vice president. The U.S. appointments of Shi’a dominated 
political figures for the Iraqi interim government resonated distrust among the Sunni 
populations. Sunni populations expressed their distain for the newly formed political 
system by initiating a boycott of the first democratically held elections in January 2005. 
The results of these elections, which occurred on 30 January 2005, were strategically 
important to Iran because it would single handedly determine the future of its influence 
inside Iraq. Iran understood that the outcome, which determined a 275-member National 
Assembly tasked with writing the new Constitution of Iraqi, could be the start to a long 
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relationship between the two countries that would place Iraq in the subordinate role. The 
Iranian established United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), backed by Grand Ayatollah Sistani, won 
140 seats. The Kurdistan Alliance won 75 seats, and the Iraqiyya List, led by Iyad 
Allawi, won 40 seats.145 The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader, Jalal Talabani, 
was elected President. Low Sunni turnout resulted in the group securing only minimal 
positions such as assembly speaker, deputy president and prime minister, and only six 
other ministerial positions. 
 The UIA, on 15 December 2005, won 128 of the 275 seats during the first full-
term parliament elections.146 The UIA did not include just the prominent ISCI and Da’wa 
Shi’a parties, but also the Sadr faction. Da’wa leader Nuri al-Maliki was selected as 
Prime minister, replacing Ibrahim al-Jaafair. Other ISCI figures took several important 
posts, and the Sadrists took five ministerial positions.147 Al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army, 
who openly opposed joining any political party, had become severely weakened in his 
battle against coalition forces in 2004. This left al-Sadr no longer in power over the 
majority of the Shi’a population of Iraq. Other Shi’a groups, such as Grand Ayatollah 
Sistani and the Hawza, and ISCI, had no problem filling the void. Sistani, as well as ISCI, 
had cooperated with coalition forces. The cooperation between the Hawza and ISCI had 
allowed them a majority of the seats during the first parliament elections in December of 
2005. Al-Sadr soon realized that for him to reemerge as the leader of the Shi’a movement 
of Iraq, he could not rely solely on violence. Sistani and al-Sadr’s political objectives 
aligned over the perceived notion of a Shi’a controlled Iraqi government, which 
permitted al-Sadr to join the UIA.  
It was Muqtada’s influence that allowed the UIA to transfer prime ministerial 
powers from Jaafair to Maliki. Maliki, the then Da’wa representative to Damascus, was 
seen among many as a compromise candidate.148 Muqtada saw Maliki’s entrance into the 
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political scene as an opportune moment for al-Sadr to gain Maliki’s support for his 
movement. However, later Maliki would find himself in a strategic struggle between 
Muqtada and the U.S. Muqtada’s views against U.S. occupation created conflict between 
Maliki in his role as Prime Minister of Iraq. Eventually this antagonism would create rifts 
between Maliki and Muqtada on the trajectory of Iraqi politics. In 2007, Muqtada 
removed himself and his party from Iraqi politics by giving up his five ministerial 
positions from the Iraqi cabinet and more importantly, the alliance with the UIA. The 
Sadrist faction removing itself from the UIA is only one indication of subsiding influence 
of Iran in Iraqi politics. In 2008, Maliki’s Da’wa party separated from ISCI and the UIA 
to for a new party called “State of Law Coalition.” This breakup among Shi’a political 
parties inevitably hurt Iran’s chances at a unified Shi’a government sympathetic to their 
regional influence.  
In January 2009, the Iraqi provincial elections changed the political landscape 
with ISCI suffering from low poll numbers. Maliki’s newly formed State of Law slate 
was able to secure 28 out of the 57 total seats, giving itself effective control of the 
Baghdad Provincial Council by displacing ISCI.149 ISCI’s poor performance during the 
provincial elections came as a shock to many observers. Some people believe that ISCI’s 
results were not only a product of its attempts of decentralizing the government among 
provinces, but also their perceived close ties to Iran. Iran and its influence in ISCI began 
to be seen by many Iraqi’s as an attempt to exercise undue influence on Iraqi politics.150 
The 2009 provincial election also indicated a weakening support among the Iraqi people 
for Iranian interference, whether perceived or factual in nature. In its wake, there is a 
growing support for Iraqi nationalist movements such as the increased votes for secular 
parties, such as that of former Prime Minster Iyad al-Allawi. Furthermore, many U.S. 
officials saw the elections as a unique opportunity for Muqtada al-Sadr to endorse a Shi’a 
party and denounce violence, much like December of 2005 where he was integrated into 
UIA. However, al-Sadr chose to only support other Sadrists on the lists, composed 
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predominately of the “Independent Liberals Trend,” that did not fair well in the elections. 
Many people believe that this failure reflects voter disillusionment with al-Sadr’s 
continued decision to field militias, which many blame as a primary source of violence in 
Iraq.151 Though the 2009 provincial elections proved successful for Maliki, there were 
many other parties such as al-Allawi that were able to gain greater political power. The 
results would force Maliki to allow the incorporation of non-Shi’a parties in order to 
retain his monopoly of power within the Iraqi government. 
Maliki got his chance to consolidate his power during the 7 March 2010, “Council 
of Representatives (COR)” elections. The COR was to determine the next four year 
national government. Maliki was seen as a clear winner of the elections allowing him to 
co-op his some of his political competitors in some provinces, many of which were Sunni 
Arabs and Sunni tribalists. However, none of these Sunni officials ranked very high in 
Maliki’s State of Law Coalition. A number of bombings over several government 
buildings in Baghdad in late 2009 and early 2010 had undermined Maliki’s control over 
the government. As a result of the perceived weakness of the Maliki government, many 
opposition Shi’a factions chose to unite under an “Iraqi National Alliance (INA)”. This 
opposition party included ISCI, Sadrists, and other prominent Shi’a political figures and 
was seen as an effort to gain the widest level of support. Maliki had to compete with both 
the INA, and the Iraqi National Movement, “Iraqiyya” led by former Prime Minister 
Lyad al-Allawi, and former Baathist leader Saleh al-Mutlaq, who appealed to the Sunni 
population. 
The result of the elections put Iraqiyya over Maliki’s State of Law slate. Maliki 
demanded a recount of the votes but the results where no different. In accordance with 
the Constitution, the newly formed COR convened but was not able to form a new 
government due to a variety of internal disputes. In May 2010, Maliki attempted to 
expand his own influence by accepting an alliance with the rival Shi’a INA. However, 
Sadr and ISCI were not able to agree on Maliki remaining the prime minister, which  
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invariably ended the alliance. During the inter-governmental disputes over the formation 
of the government persisted, Maliki was able to exert his authority in the role of acting 
prime minister.  
In October of 2010, Maliki received the backing of the majority of the forty COR 
deputies supporting al-Sadr, which brought Maliki within reach of another term as prime 
minister.152 This new alignment, once again uniting the fractured Shi’a parties, allowed 
affairs within the Iraqi government to continue. However, at the same time these alliances 
within the Shi’a political groups further isolated the Sunni party Iraqiyya from 
participation. In December 2010, Maliki presented the cabinet of the COR, that allowed 
Maliki to remain as prime minister as well as minister of Defense, Interior, and State. 
Iraqiyya was given deputy prime mister and president, and nine other ministerial posts. 
The INA faction received 13 ministries, eight of which were given to the Sadr faction.  
Al-Sadr’s acceptance of various political positions in the Iraqi government has 
changed his tone towards Iraqi affairs. By incorporating himself into the process, 
Muqtada could no longer criticize governmental decisions. Though he supported the 
Maliki government, Muqtada strongly supported an immediate U.S. troop withdrawal 
from Iraq by suggesting removal by the initial December 2011 deadline as agreed upon 
the Iraqi Parliament Status of Forces agreement (SOFA) and the U.S. in November 2008. 
President Bush and the Maliki government agreement on the 2008 SOFA indicated a 
timetable allowing for renegotiation in 2011 that would invariably extend U.S. troop 
involvement in a training and support capacity. During that time, Maliki was able to use 
his influence over the U.S. to his advantage while he was in a power struggle with other 
Shi’a factions such as Muqtada. However, as the Maliki government became more 
powerful, there was less need for the security by U.S. forces. The decline of this 
relationship between Maliki and the U.S. led to the renegotiation of the 2008 SOFA. In 
September 2011, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta proposed a plan that would keep 3,000 
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to 4,000 US troops in Iraq after the 2011 deadline, only to train Iraqi security forces.153 
The Iraqi government approved the extension of U.S. troops, but only under the 
stipulation that they can no longer be immune from local laws.    
The struggle between various political factions within the Iraqi government has 
exacerbated the need for factions to ally with other ideologically similar parties. In many 
cases this unity has made the affairs within the government easier to accomplish. 
However, by doing so this unity has also isolated other ethnic minority groups, such as 
the Sunni’s, who wish for inclusion into the process. The alliance formed by Maliki’s 
“State of Law” and Muqtada in October of 2010, which resulted in a Shi’a led Iraqi 
government, aligned nicely with Iran’s strategic objectives in the region. Iran asserted 
itself by playing a direct role in the commission that excluded Sunni and secular 
candidates from the ballot, and has supported both that Badr Brigades and Sadr 
factions.154 However, public opinion polls indicate the vast majority of Iraqi’s feel that 
although Iran has successfully influenced the current Iraqi government, they continue to 
reject its inference. Anthony Cordesman’s, Iraq and the United States: Creating a 
Strategic Partnership, best captured this viewpoint by stating: 
Iran is not popular but has ties to ISCI, continues to have ties to elements 
in the Sadr and splinter militias, and has influence in a number of areas. 
Most Iraqis, including most Shi’ites polled, do not support or trust it. This 
mistrust has been compounded by Iran’s support of a mix of rival Shi’ite 
militias, occasional support of Sunni insurgent elements in the past, and 
current support for splinter groups in the Sadrist movement. So far, Iran’s 
deals with Iraq have given some leverage over the government, but have 
produced little gratitude.155 
These words unambiguously show the Iraqi distrust for Iranian political intervention. 
Though public opinion polls in Iraq suggest that the large majority of the Shi’a 
population distrusts Iranian interference, it is the Sunni population that most fears it. This 
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fear was compounded in January 2010, when the Justice and Accountability Commission 
(JAC), successor of the “De-Baathification Commission,” invalidated 499 individuals 
from political representation.156 The JAC was headed up by Ali al-Lami, a Shi’a, who 
had been in U.S. military custody during 2005–2006 for alleged assistance to Iranian 
agents active in Iraq.157 Maliki, in December 2011, increased the Shi’a-Sunni divide 
when he accused Vice President, al-Hashemi, of running Sunni hit squads that targeted 
government officials. Al-Hashemi, a prominent member of the Iraqiyya political party 
that was in direct competition with Maliki during the 2010 provincial elections, was 
forced to flee north to the Kurdish region of Iraq. Maliki’s decision to accuse al-Hashemi 
of crimes has increased Shi’a-Sunni sectarian tensions within the Iraqi government. 
Sectarian rifts inside the Iraqi government have contributed to its overall ineffectiveness. 
Future weakness within the Iraqi government may allow it to become more susceptible to 
external influence, namely Iran.  
Though Maliki has confronted many obstacles in his rise to power, he has 
successfully consolidated his power within the Iraqi political system. Maliki’s 
achievements could not be possible without his unique ability of balancing competing 
interests and influences. As a member of Da’wa party, Maliki fled to Iran in 1979 to 
conduct military raids against Saddam and his regime from across the border. Iranian 
influence for Da’wa decreased after the establishment of SCIRI giving Maliki and his 
party more freedom to pursue its Iraqi agendas. Though Maliki has distanced himself 
from Iran, he has been known to visit his counterparts in Tehran to discuss regional 
affairs. On occasion Maliki has also used Iran to influence Iraqi politics. In 2010, Iran 
was instrumental in convincing al-Sadr to join Maliki’s “State of Law” party ensuring 
long-term Shi’a domination in Iraqi politics. Maliki’s delicate balance was also noticed in 
his support for U.S. actions in Iraq used to prevent other influences from allocating too 
much power. It was Maliki’s decision to initiate the 2008 Iraqi led operation known as 
“Charge of the Knights” to dismantle Muqtada’s JAM dominated regions of Basra. By  
                                                 
156 Katzman, Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights, 9. 
157 Katzman, Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights, 9. 
 57 
eliminating Sadr, Maliki was no longer threatened by emergence of any Shi’a political 
opposition. At the same time Maliki’s decision aligned with U.S. objectives of restoring 
stability and security to Iraq.  
Maliki’s delicate balance of power can also be seen in his welcoming of the 
Iranian supported AAH into Iraq’s political system. Many observers believe that this 
notion of bringing Iranian backed Shi’a militant organizations into the government will 
inevitably bring Iraq closer to the Iranian sphere of influence. Though this may be in 
some measure true, there is greater insight by Maliki into this controversial decision to 
bring AAH into the political process. Despite U.S. and coalition forces withdrawal in 
January 2012 there continues to be a wave of attacks on both Shi’a and Sunni religious 
groups that have undermined Maliki’s security efforts in Iraq. Without having the ability 
of the Maliki government to provide social services such as security, people will have no 
choice but to place their support behind armed militant groups such as AAH. Maliki has 
attempted to undermine the authority of these special groups by integrating them into the 
Iraq government. 
Maliki has attempted to regain control over Iraqi security by initiating deals with 
both Shi’a and Sunni militant groups. In addition to the integration of such militant 
groups as AAH into the political system, some observers believe that Maliki may use 
AAH and their credentials to divide challengers in his own coalition and weaken al-
Sadr’s political power.158 Qais Khazali, head of AAH in Iraq, was a former al-Sadr 
movement supporter that studied under Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada’s father. 
Muqtada however expelled Khazali from the JAM in 2004 for suspected insubordination 
during the battle of Najaf against U.S. forces. By bringing AAH closer into Iraqi politics, 
Maliki is able build a stronger and more unified Shi’a coalition. Khazali’s historically 
contentious relationship with al-Sadr reinforces Maliki’s decision to integrate AAH 
without fear of al-Sadr loyalty. 
Iraqi Shi’a Militant groups have operated in the past in a unified effort to expel 
foreign occupation by the U.S. and other coalition forces by armed conflict. Maliki 
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successfully utilized U.S. and coalition security forces in a way to maximize his power. 
After Maliki saw the U.S. as no longer strategically important to him, he shifted alliances 
allowing the prevention of renewal of the 2008 SOFA, liberating them from a U.S. 
dominated influence. The withdrawal in January 2012 has provided the conditions for 
many of these militant groups to throw down their weapons and join Iraqi society in a 
peaceful way.  Although many people see Maliki’s integration of militant groups into 
society as beneficial, others believe that such groups do not have the inclination to 
operate in any other capacity than violence.   
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VI. CONCLUSION: ARE THE SHI’A OF IRAQ IRAN’S PROXY? 
During a student symposium titled “The Youth and Islamic Awareness,” Al 
Arabiya News reported that Brigadier General of IRGC-QF, Qasem Soleimani, said that 
the Islamic Republic controls “in one way or another” Iraq and South Lebanon and that 
Tehran is capable of influencing the advent of Islamist governments in order to fight 
“arrogant” powers.159 As previously discussed, this thesis has argued that many U.S. 
policy makers believe that Iran has supported armed Shi’a militias throughout the last 
decade in Iraq. By doing so, Iran has successfully broadened its foreign policy options 
including pressuring U.S. and coalition forces out of Iraq, militarily make it impossible 
for the U.S. to claim victory, and enabling pro-Iranian militant groups in the region to 
engage Iranian enemies on its behalf if necessary.160 General Soleimani, the unofficial 
Iranian spokesman on Iraqi affairs, has been instrumental in the creation of these client 
militant groups that are able to carry out Iran’s proxy war against its enemies. Having 
direct control over AAH and KH militant groups, Soleimani has dramatically increased 
Iran’s level of influence inside Iraq. 
From the evidence collected during this thesis, it is difficult to deny Iran’s 
overbearing influence in almost every aspect of Iraqi affairs. Of all the different facets of 
Iranian influence, none are as important as its involvement in the creation of various Iraqi 
Shi’a militias. Why has Iran been successful in influencing the Shi’a militant groups of 
Iraq? This thesis has argued that there are many connections between Iran and Iraq. It is 
evident that, historically, Iran has played an important geostrategic role in Iraq. Many of 
the Shi’a communities share religious shrines in both countries and also share many 
cultural and linguistic connections with each other. Despite these ties, the Shi’a of Iraq 
have remained ideologically independent from Iran by successfully blending its Arab  
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identity with that of its shared Shi’a religion. It is this unique ideological split that has 
allowed Iraqi Shi’as to separate themselves from the majority Sunni ruled Arab world 
and that of the religiously dominated Shi’a of Iran. 
The Shi’a of Iraq’s ideological differences from both Sunni’s of the Arab world 
and that of Iran have historically labeled them as outsiders in their own country. During 
the twentieth century, Sunni dominated Iraqi regimes exaggerated the Iraq-Iran Shi’a 
relationship to marginalize the Shi’a population, ensuring they never received integration 
into the Iraqi government. The Shi’a population, despite being mostly banned from 
political participation, continued to identify themselves primarily as Iraqis and only 
second as Shi’as. The Shi’a population’s blend of Iraqi nationalism is used to explain 
how and why Iraq could sustain an eight-year war with an army composed of 80 percent 
of the Shi’a faith against a Shi’a nation led by an ayatollah of noble descent from the 
Shi’a Imams.161  
The Iraq-Iran war is only one example of the Iraqi Shi’a support for Iraq over its 
perceived Iranian influence. While the vast majority of Iraqi Shi’a supported Iraqi 
ambitions, some religious groups connected with their Shi’a ideology and used it as a 
political alternative to the repressive nature of the Sunni dominated secular regimes. 
Many people of the Shi’a faith joined prominent religious groups such as al-Da’wa and 
later, SCIRI. The Sunni dominated Iraqi government saw the formation of these religious 
groups as a threat to the state and took swift action to eliminate them. Despite the regimes 
attempts, groups such as Da’wa survived only by escaping to Iran where they became 
heavily influenced by their hosts. Other groups such as SCIRI, though an Iraqi 
organization, were formed in Iran and lead by Iranians to fight against the Iraqi Baathist 
regime. These groups were able to flourish in Iran based on their similar goals of 
removing the Iraqi regime. One example, the Badr brigade operated as an armed wing 
from inside Iran, in hopes of destabilizing the Iraqi regime. 
The U.S. invasion of Iraq and the subsequent removal of Saddam Hussein’s 
Ba’athist regime presented the Da’wa party and SCIRI with an opportunity to reemerge 
from its underground Islamic activism and participate in Iraqi politics. Da’wa, as a result, 
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has reorganized itself in an effort to portray itself as a genuinely independent Iraqi 
nationalist movement. The future of Da’wa in the post-Saddam era of Iraqi politics, 
however, has been plague with competition from other Shi’a Islamic groups such as 
SCIRI and the Sadrists. Recently, the Da’wa party has gained the strongest support 
among Iraqis as seen by Nuri al-Maliki, a prominent Da’wa member’s election to the 
position of Iraqi Prime Minister. 
The political vacuum left after Saddam’s removal invariably lead to a power 
struggle among the Iraqi Shi’a community. The prior establishment of Shi’a religious 
groups in Iraq, such as Da’wa and SCIRI, created an environment that prevented a 
unified Shi’a political voice. Iran sought to maximize its influence in Iraqi politics by 
supporting various Shi’a factions inside Iraq by appealing to their similar religious 
ideologies.  In an effort to unite the various Shi’a political groups in Iraq, Iran attempted 
to play a vital role in the establishment of the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), which 
included the majority of the Iraqi Shi’a political factions at that time, namely ISCI and 
Da’wa. The results of the elections, which determined a 275-member National Assembly 
tasked with writing the new Constitution of Iraqi, was the first success of Iran towards 
hegemony in Iraq. The elections on 30 January 2005, proved the Iranian strategy 
effective, with UIA receiving the majority of seats in the assembly, allowing Iranian 
influence into the writing of the first post-Saddam era Iraqi constitution. 
At the same time in 2005, at the height of their influence in Iraq, Iran also 
provided measured support to various Shi’a militant groups in an attempt to counter the 
U.S.’ expanding footprint within in the region. Is Iran’s support for Iraqi Shi’a groups 
based on their shared Shi’a religion or is there more to this motivation? Marisa Cochrane, 
an expert in Shi’a militia activity from the Institute for the Study of War, defines such 
special groups as “Shi’a militia cells that receive funding, training, and weapons from 
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), the Iranian Special 
Forces that export the Islamic Revolution to other countries.”162 The key to 
understanding the relationship between Iran and the Iraqi Shi’a special groups, according 
to Cochrane, is the SP’s willingness to export Iran’s Islamic revolution inside Iraq. This 
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thesis, however, argues there are more than just similar religious affiliations that motivate 
such this relationship. Iran has used these special groups, not in a religious capacity, but 
in an ideological struggle against the background of a shared U.S. antagonism. By 
influencing such groups, Iran has created intricate proxies, able to carry out attacks 
against Iran’s enemies. In an effort to do so, Iran hopes to increase its regional influence 
among its Middle Eastern neighbors, namely Iraq. 
The U.S. and coalition forces saw early on the increase in activity by Shi’a 
militant groups and their ties to Iran as destabilizing and counterproductive to their 
objectives in Iraq. Increased pressure by U.S. and coalition forces inevitably made these 
Shi’a militant groups more accepting of outside assistance from Iran. Shi’a militia groups 
accept aid in return for allowing Iran greater control over their operations inside Iraq. 
Many analysts believe that the combined offensives waged by coalition and Iraqi Security 
Forces against the Shi’a special groups forced much of the leadership across the border 
into Iran. Though these special groups operate under different leadership they all have 
one common objective: to pressure U.S forces into leaving Iraq by inflicting heavy 
causalities. There may be similar religious ideologies among the Iranian government and 
the Shi’a special groups of Iraq, though it is their shared antagonism against the U.S. that 
drives the consistent relationship. 
Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran has sought to extend its regional 
influence by pursuing a deliberate policy of destabilization in Arab countries who have 
supported US interests abroad, most in Lebanon. Throughout the 1980–90s Hezbollah 
often employed the ideology of armed jihad within Lebanon. This included a variety of 
techniques including martyrdom operations, guerrilla warfare, hostage taking, and 
forceful seizure of power all with the aim of ridding Lebanon of its foreign presence.163 
The same Lebanon scenario can be applied to Iraq as Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani 
so elegantly points out during the January 2012 Islamic Youth Student symposium held 
in Tehran. This thesis has shown evidence that the Iranian government has supported 
Hezbollah style influence in Iraq and would like nothing more for a mirrored scenario as 
that in Lebanon. AAH and KH militant groups are both suspected of receiving training 
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from Lebanese Hezbollah inside Iran. Though Hezbollah, another Shi’a militant group 
seems to indicate similar religious motivations to that of Iran, Iran has also been known 
to provide measured support for that are ideologically different, if not opposite.  
One of the most ideologically different groups Iran has been accused of 
supporting is the Sunni Taliban in Afghanistan. Despite these differences, Iran has been 
accused of providing the Taliban with measured support. The U.S. Department 2009 
State Country Report on Terrorism, identifies this level of Iranian support by stating: 
Iran’s Qods Force provided training to the Taliban in Afghanistan on 
small unit tactics, small arms, explosives, and indirect fire. Since at least 
2006, Iran has arranged arms shipments to select Taliban members, 
including small arms and associated ammunition, rocket propelled 
grenades, mortar rounds, 107mm rockets, and plastic explosives.164  
Alireza Nader’s, “Iran’s Balancing Act in Afghanistan,” argues the Taliban, 
though anti-Shi’a and anti-Iranian in nature, have benefited from the U.S.-Iranian 
rivalry.165 Similarly, Iran benefits from the relationship by allowing the Taliban to 
continue to keep U.S. forces occupied in Afghanistan and therefore deterring and 
countering the potential for a U.S. attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran’s mixed foreign 
policy decisions on Afghanistan, as Nader describes as a “hedging strategy,” shows on 
one hand, their support the overthrow of the Taliban for greater regional security and on 
the other, would implement policies to undermine U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Iranian 
support for anti-U.S. terrorist groups, in the Middle East region and beyond, has been an 
effort to achieve its overarching Iranian foreign policies. These policies have allowed 
these pro-Iranian proxies to be called upon by the Iranian regime if it perceived itself 
being threated on a number of its strategic interest in the region, most importantly being 
the countries infant nuclear weapons program. The common theme that ties Shi’a special 
groups in Iraq, Taliban in Afghanistan, and other Iranian supported terrorist organizations 
in the region is their shared antagonism against the U.S. and its allies.  
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What is the level of support Iran provides to the Shi’a militant groups of Iraq? 
This thesis has explained that Iran has actively engaged in support for such groups since 
the invasion of 2003. During this period, Iran’s heavy support for Shi’a militant groups 
increased its overall influence in Iraq. This influence can be directly translated to the 
success of the Iranian sponsored United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) in 2005 at the height of 
Shi’a militant group activity. Since that time, however, the Iraqi Shi’a communities 
inability to remain united has had decreased Iran’s overall influence in Iraq. This 
fragmentation, in part due to the inability of Shi’a political groups such as Da’wa and 
ISCI to unite under a single party affiliation, has created rifts in the Shi’a led Iraqi 
government. Similarly, fault lines in the JAM and Sadr factions created groups such as 
AAH, KH, and the Promised Day Brigades. All of these groups have different leadership 
and objectives, dividing the Iraqi Shi’a community in its political pursuits. Despite these 
differences, Iran has attempted to support multiple Shi’a militant groups in Iraq by 
provided advanced weaponry, financial support, and training to ensure that none operate 
independently or without Iranian backing. The dependency of these special groups on the 
support by Iran has in Iraq started to surge in late 2006 and may be linked to the 
movement of arms from Lebanon after the Hezbollah-Israeli conflict. In 2008, ISCI and 
its Badr Brigade collaborated with the Maliki government during Operation “Charge of 
the Knights” against Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army dramatically decreasing the 
level of activity by Shi’a special groups. 
The Shi’a special groups activity has remained active throughout the post-Saddam 
era and can be directly linked to the level of U.S. forces in Iraq and their actions. 
Violence conducted by these groups against U.S. and ISI forces has been witnessed even 
as late as January 2011. Increases during this time can be seen as a direct response to the 
Iraqi governments attempts to renegotiate the SOFA for U.S. forces to remain in Iraq. 
U.S. and Iraqi differences that arose during the SOFA renegotiation, leading to a non-
renewal of the SOFA, indicates the level of influence these groups may have over the 
Iraqi government. The U.S. withdrawal of forces in January 2012 has also led to a 
decrease violent activity conducted by the special groups. Iran today enjoys a smaller 
influence among Shi’a militant groups of Iraq. Without a shared interest in Iraq through 
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the lens of a U.S-Iranian enmity, Iran’s need for Shi’a special groups in Iraq could see an 
end altogether. The end of such a relationship can also explain why the some special 
groups, such as the AAH, have decided against continuing to pursue violent means by 
instead throwing down their weapons and accepting integration into the Iraqi 
government.  
There is a growing mistrust among all Iraqi’s, Sunni and Shi’a, of the influence of 
Iran in its affairs. At a time, after the collapse of Saddam’s regime, it could be argued that 
the need for Iranian support was wanted and needed by the Shi’a of Iraq. Today, 
however, the decision of the Iraqi government to force U.S. and coalition forces out of 
the country, could be seen not only as a move away from U.S., but also Iranian regional 
influences. U.S. troops withdrawal in early 2012 has left the Iraqi Shi’a militant groups 
and Iran without a shared common enemy. Without this shared enemy the relationship 
between Iran and Iraq will become less strategically important. Iran in the future will no 
doubt continue to pursue a policy of influence among Iraqi affairs. Despite these 
attempts, Iraq will continue on a trajectory towards its own nationalistic objectives, free 
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